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PREDECISION BARGAINING AND THE CORE OF
ENTREPRENEURIAL CONTROL: THE UPS AND
DOWNS OF OTIS ELEVATOR
Ronald Turner*
INTRODUCTION
Plant closings and relocations, the subcontracting of work, and decisions
about prices, products and capital investment have increasingly caused
corporate transformations and dislocations throughout industry., The labor
law implications of these decisions and other managerial endeavors which
result in the restructuring and reorganization of companies are significant.
Both the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") and the
federal courts are increasingly being asked to resolve labor-management
conflicts that arise from employers' decisions to alter the organization of
work and implement changes in their enterprises.'
* Adjunct Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law, Fall 1988; Research
Associate, The Wharton School, Industrial Research Unit, University of Pennsylvania; Asso-
ciate, Schiff, Hardin & Waite, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., magna cum laude, Wilberforce University,
1980; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1984.
1. See Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging
Possibilities, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 73, 73-79 (1988) (discussing organized labor's initiatives to
obtain involvement in corporate decision making). See generally Miscimarra, Seller or Prede-
cessor Obligations Under the NLRA, in GOVERNMENT PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES INVOLVED IN
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 15-93 (H. Northrup & P. Miscimarra, eds. 1989) (discussing duty
to bargain, including Otis Elvator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984), rev'g, 255 N.L.R.B. 235
(1981)); P. MISCIMARRA, THE NLRB AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION: PLANT CLOSINGS, RELOCA-
TIONS, SUBCONTRACTING, AND AUTOMATION 133-261 (1983) [hereinafter P. MISCIMARRA, THE
NLRB AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION] (surveying duty to bargain as it existed prior to Otis
Elevator).
2. The NLRB's and courts' roles in the resolution of these issues are discussed below. For
a discussion of the role of arbitrators in interpreting collective bargaining contracts in plant
closure and relocation cases, see Turner, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Collective Bargaining
Agreement Provisions, in GOVERNMENT PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES INVOLVED IN MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS, supra note 1, at 353-408; Schatzki, Some Comments on the Labor-Management
Law Applied To Plant Closures and Relocations, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (1984). For a
discussion of other issues relative to plant shutdowns and relocations, see Barron, Causes and
Impact of Plant Shutdowns and Relocations and Potential Non-NLRA Responses, 58 TUL. L.
REV. 1389 (1984) (discussing loss of jobs resulting from closures, impact on employees and
communities, and possible solutions, including requiring notice to employees).
Congress addressed one aspect of plant closures in the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, §§ 2-10, 102 Stat. 890 (1988), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101-
2109 (West Supp. 1989) ("WARN Act"). The WARN Act requires employers with at least 100
employees (§ 2101(a)(1)) to provide 60 calendar days advance notice of plant closings (§
2101(a)(2)) and of mass layoffs (§ 2101(a)(3)) to nonunion affected employees, the employees'
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Much of the legal activity in the past few years has involved the question
of whether the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act") 3 requires
representative, and to state and local government officials (§ 2102(a)). The statute exempts,
inter alia, closings or layoffs related to temporary facilities and limited duration projects,
(§ 2103(l)), as well as strikes or lockouts "not intended to evade" the statute. See § 2103(2).
The WARN Act is enforced by the civil penalties set forth in § 2104. Employers who fail to
provide the required notice are "liable to each aggrieved employee who suffers an employment
loss as a result of [the] closing or layoff for" back pay and benefits "for the period of the
violation, up to a maximum of 60 days." § 2104(a)(l). Employers who fail to provide adequate
notice to local government officials are also subject to a fine of up to $500 per each day of
violation (a maximum of $30,000 over the 60-day notice period). § 2104(a)(3). That penalty
does not apply if the employer in violation of the WARN Act pays to each aggrieved employee
the full amount owed within three weeks from the date the employer ordered the shutdown or
layoff. Id. See also Final Rule, Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification, 54 Fed. Reg.
16,064 (1989) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 639.1). The Department of Labor, Employment
& Training Administration's comments were issued with the Final Rule. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042-
64 (Apr. 20, 1989). For an excellent summary and discussion of the WARN Act, see Miscimarra,
supra note 1, at 149-92.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). See generally Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith,
71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1403 (1958) (discussing NLRB's development of duty to bargain "in
good faith," allowing Board "to condemn any conduct which sharply departs from good
bargaining practice." (citing Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 856 (1954), enforcement denied,
224 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1955), rev'd, 351 U.S. 149 (1956); International Union, United Mine
Workers, 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957), enf'd, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1958); and Textile Workers
Union, 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954), enforced in part, set aside in part, 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 864 (1956))).
A significant and related issue that is beyond the scope of this Article concerns an employer's
obligation to bargain over the effects of its managerial decisions, regardless of whether those
decisions are themselves subject to the bargaining obligation mandated by the Act. See Misci-
marra, supra note 1, at 23-27; P. MlSCIMARRA, THE NLRB AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION, supra
note 1, at 16-19. See also Kohler, Distinctions Without Differences: Effects Bargaining In Light
of First National Maintenance, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 402, 414-15 (1983) ("effects-bargaining"
gives union opportunity to discuss impact of managerial decision on employees' rights); Brown
Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1953) (the employer was required "to
advise the Union of the contemplated move and to give the Union the opportunity to bargain
with respect to the contemplated move as it affected the employees . . .").
Thus, effects-bargaining over "issues such as severance pay, seniority and pensions, among
others, are necessarily of particular relevance and importance." NLRB v. Royal Plating &
Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965). The scope of effects-bargaining is not limited;
rather, the bargaining obligation encompasses all effects flowing from the implementation of a
managerial decision. See Kohler, supra, at 415 (scope is unlimited and "[t]he most crucial ...
[effects] are opportunities for continued employment at the employer's other facilities."); Soule
Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1085-86 (1st Cir. 1981) (broad scope of effects-
bargaining does not include union's "forcing [the employer] to forego the proposed change"
(quoting International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
473 F.2d 549, 558 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972))).
The effects-bargaining obligation of employers has been recently recognized and emphasized
by both the United States Supreme Court and the Board. In First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 682 (1981), the Court admonished that effects-bargaining must take place
"in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time ....... Id. Similarly, the Board has
consistently held that an employer violates the Act by failing to bargain over the effects of its
decision. See, e.g., Stamping Specialty Co., 294 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH)
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an employer to collectively bargain with a labor organization before deciding
to partially close or relocate particular operations. This process, generally
referred to as "predecision bargaining," raises fundamental questions con-
cerning an employer's freedom to make and implement certain entrepre-
neurial initiatives, and a union's involvement in matters of obvious concern
to employees.
Two significant decisions have held that predecision bargaining is required
in certain contexts. In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 4 the
United States Supreme Court held that an employer's decision to close part
of its business for purely economic reasons was not subject to mandatory
bargaining. Similarly, in Otis Elevator Co. ("Otis I"),' a Board plurality
applied its view of the standards developed in First National Maintenance
to construct a "business direction-labor costs" dichotomy and concluded
that an employer's plant relocation decision was not subject to mandatory
bargaining under the Act.
There is no dearth of scholarly comment on First National Maintenance,6
and this article is not intended to add to the numerous critiques and analyses
15,576 (May 31, 1989) (employer's failure to notify union of decision to discontinue product
line and lay off employees denied union opportunity for effects-bargaining in violation of
sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5)); David Wolcott Kendall Mem. School, 292 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 5
Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 15,407 (Feb. 14, 1989) (refusal to bargain over effects of compliance
with state requirement of master's degree for faculty violated section 8(a)(5)); Ozark Trailers,
Inc. 161 N.L.R.B., 561, 564 (1966) (decision to close plant without notice to union prevented
effects-bargaining and violated section 8(a)(5)).
Also beyond the scope of this Article is the issue of the "midterm contract modification
doctrine" which posits that certain modifications of a collective bargaining agreement during
a contract term would be illegal even where the employer engaged in decision and effects-
bargaining. See Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enforced, 602
F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979). The Board reaffirmed the aforementioned doctrine, in Milwaukee
Spring Div. of Illinois Coil Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982) [hereinafter Milwaukee Spring
1], remanded without opinion, 718 F.2d 1102 (7th Cir. 1983), but subsequently rejected it in
Milwaukee Spring Div. of Illinois Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) [hereinafter
Milwaukee Spring II], aff'd sub nom. International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
In Milwaukee Spring I1, the Board concluded that the employer's mid-contract term relocation
of operations was not prohibited by any term contained in the employer-union labor agreement,
and rejected the arguments that the relocation modified the wage, benefits and union recognition
clauses of the labor agreement. See 268 N.L.R.B. at 602. For an excellent discussion of the
Milwaukee Spring litigation, see Miscimarra, supra note 1, at 64-68.
4. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
5. 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984) [hereinafter Otis II], rev'g, Otis Elevator Co., 255 N.L.R.B.
235 (1981).
6. See, e.g., P. MISCIMARRA, THE NLRB AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION, supra note 1, at
147-55 (concluding that Supreme Court's intent in First National Maintenance was subject to
differing applications because of unresolved issues in the decision); George, To Bargain or Not
to Bargain: A New Chapter in Work Relocation Decisions, 69 MINN. L. REV. 667, 680 (1985)
(criticizing First National Maintenance and the Supreme Court's "adoption of a case-by-case
balancing test," applied "in such a way as to create a per se rule of not requiring bargaining
for partial closure decisions."); Gorman, The Negligible Impact of the National Labor Relations
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of that decision. Rather, this discussion focuses on the NLRB's Otis II
decision and its progeny, and on the NLRB's current treatment of transfer,
relocation and other related managerial decisions. This examination is es-
pecially timely because the NLRB has steadfastly declined to adopt any one
of three approaches articulated by the Board in Otis Elevator IL These
three approaches are as follows:
(1) the standard keyed to labor costs enunciated by former Chairman
Donald Dotson and former Member Robert Hunter;7
(2) former Member Patricia Dennis' opinion which focused on amenability
to bargaining and the balance between the benefits and burdens of the
bargaining process;' and,
(3) the broader amenability to bargaining analysis set forth in former
Member Don Zimmerman's opinion .
Board decisions applying First National Maintenance and Otis II have
typically relied upon any and all of the views expressed by the Supreme
Court or the Board in both of those decisions.10
That none of the differing Otis II approaches has commanded a three-
Member majority of the Board is more than merely an academic point. A
clearly articulated NLRB majority position would provide a more definitive
rule to guide subsequent Board and court decisions. The departure of all
of the Board Members who decided Otis H from the NLRB makes the need
for guidance even more significant. In the absence of such guidance, Board
Act on Managerial Decisions to Close or Relocate, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1354, 1362 (1984) (discussing
First National Maintenance as "summed up ... as an unexamined exaltation of the employer's
interest in unfettered control over major managerial decisions, without sufficient concern for a
most basic statutory policy," i.e., participation of workers in predecision bargaining); Gould,
The Burger Court and Labor Law: The Beat Goes On-Marcato, 24 SAN DiEoo L. REV. 51,
64 (1987) (arguing that First National Maintenance overrode approach of giving broad scope
to both union and management to bring issues to the bargaining table "in the name of
management prerogatives"); Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to First National
Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1450 (1982) (positing
that First National Maintenance "can be reconciled on its facts with a limited and economically
meaningful principle . .. [which] would exclude from compulsory bargaining all decisions that
determine what products are created and sold, in what quantities, for which markets, and at
what prices. " (emphasis in original)); Stone, supra note 1, at 91 (First National Maintenance
"signified a major retreat from the ideal of industrial democracy and shared decision making
. 9)7. See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part III-B. As this Article was being prepared for printing, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued its opinion in United Food and
Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local 150-A v. NLRB, No. 88-1084 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 4, 1989)
[hereinafter UFCW Int'l Union]. The court remanded the case to the NLRB because both the
Board and its administrative law judge failed to explain their conclusions, and because the
Board neither adopted a majority position nor explained how its conclusion was valid under
all of the views of Otis II. Id. slip op. at 30-32. See infra notes 237-51 and accompanying text
for a discussion of UFCW Int'l Union.
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Members are obliged to chart their own course with respect to agreeing or
disagreeing with, and adopting, the varying approaches in this area."
This Article traces the evolution of, and changes in, the NLRB's prede-
cision bargaining jurisprudence as reflected in Otis 11 and its progeny. Part
I presents a brief overview of the duty to bargain under the Act and the
deferential standard of review applied by the federal courts of appeals to
NLRB determinations of whether bargaining over a particular matter is
mandatory or permissive. Part II discusses the Supreme Court decisions
which have defined the duty to bargain over business conduct decisions and
provided the framework for the Board's decision in Otis IL Otis II and its
progeny are discussed in Part III, with particular emphasis placed on the
absence of a Board majority view with regard to which of the three
approaches articulated therein states the test for which decisions are man-
datory subjects of bargaining. As noted in Part III, the Board has recently
moved away from a test focused upon labor costs in the subcontracting
context, but has extended Otis II to encompass economically-based layoff
decisions.' 2 Finally, Part IV concludes that Otis II, as applied, is not the
definitive and outcome-determinative decision that it has been portrayed to
be. Rather, it is imperative that an NLRB majority decide what standard
is the standard for determining what decisions are mandatory bargaining
subjects, and discontinue the current (albeit institutionally safer) practice
of announcing without further explanation that an employer is or is not
required to predecision bargain under First National Maintenance and any
of the views expressed in Otis IL
I. THE EMPLOYER'S DUTY To BARGAIN AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE To
NLRB SECTION 8(d) RULINGS
Three provisions of the NLRA govern an employer's duty to collectively
bargain with a labor organization. Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor
11. As of September 1989, only two Board Members-Chairman James Stephens and
Member Mary Cracraft-were confirmed and serving terms (due to expire in 1990 and 1991,
respectively). Labor Relations Expediter (BNA) 9057 (1989). Member Wilford W. Johansen
resigned from the Board on June 16, 1989 and entered private practice. See Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 122, at A-8, A-9 (June 27, 1989); Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 139, at A-7 (July
21, 1989). Two Members-John E. Higgins Jr. and Dennis Devaney-were serving recess
appointments as of September 1989. On July 20, 1989, President Bush nominated management
lawyer Clifford R. Oviatt, Jr. to fill the seat vacated by Johansen. Id. President Bush also
nominated Donald Rodgers, an official in the U.S. Department of Labor, to fill the seat
currently occupied by Higgins. Id. On September 29, 1989, President Bush announced that
Devaney would be nominated to serve a full five year term. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
189, at A-9 (Oct. 2, 1989). On October 4, 1989, the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee approved the nominations of Devaney, Oviatt, and Rodgers to seats on the Board,
and referred the nominations to the full Senate for approval. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
192, at A-5 (Oct. 5, 1989).
12. For discussion of the application of Otis II to subcontracting decisions, and to econom-
ically based layoff decisions, see infra notes 165-70, and 179-89, respectively, and accompanying
text.
1989]
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practice for an employer 3 "to refuse to bargain collectively with the rep-
resentatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of Section 9(a)."' 4
Section 9(a) provides that a labor organization chosen by a majority of
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit "shall be the exclusive repre-
sentatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment."' 5
In construing section 8(a)(5), reference must be made to the definition of
collective bargaining found in section 8(d) of the Act. 6 Thus, a determi-
nation as to whether an employer has violated section 8(a)(5) by refusing
to bargain collectively with the exclusive representative of an appropriate
unit of his employees depends on the meaning of section 8(d). That section's
definition of the duty to bargain obligates both parties to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment" i.e., mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing. 17
13. Section 2(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C: § 152(2), defines "employer" to include any person
acting as an agent of the employer, but excludes the federal government, wholly owned
government corporations, Federal Reserve Banks, state or political subdivisions, persons subject
to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151-188 (1982), and labor organizations not acting as
employers. A substantial proportion of American workers fall outside the coverage of the
NLRA. Gorman, supra note 6, at 1354.
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). Unions are also required to collectively bargain in good faith
with employers. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). For an extensive treatment of the NLRB's rules concerning bar-
gaining unit determinations, see generally J. ABODEELY, R. HAMMER & A. SANDLER, THE NLRB
AND THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT (2d ed. 1981).
16. Section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), was added to the NLRA in 1947. As proposed, § 8(d)
would have limited the Act's bargaining obligation to: (1) wage rates, hours of employment,
and work requirements; (2) procedures with regard to discharge, suspension, layoff, recall,
seniority, discipline, promotion, demotion, transfer, and unit assignment; (3) safety, sanitation,
and health conditions; (4) leaves of absence and vacations; and, (5) the administration of, and
other procedures relating to, these subjects. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11) (1947),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 158,
166-167 [hereinafter LEG. HIST.]; H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1947),
reprinted in LEG. HIST., supra, at 292, 313-14.
Rejecting" this proposal, Congress decided in favor of general language which requires
bargaining over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. §
158(d), quoted infra note 17. See generally First Nat'l Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666,
675 (1981) (Congress intended to give Board power to define § 158(d) "in light of specific
industrial practices"); George, supra note 6, at 671-72 (Congress chose general rather than
specific language).
17. Section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), provides, in relevant part:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer
and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree
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The designation of a particular subject matter as a mandatory subject of
bargaining triggers the statutory duty to bargain of both the employer,
under section 8(a)(5) and the union, under section 8(b)(3). The duty to
bargain requires management to consult with the union before taking action
and prohibits certain unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of
employment which are mandatory subjects of bargaining prior to reaching
a bona fide impasse in bargaining. 8 Once an impasse is reached,' 9 an
to a proposal or require the making of a concession . . . . (emphasis added).
The term "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" in § 8(d) "includes
only issues that settle an aspect of the relationship between the employer and employees."
Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971)
(citing NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958)). In Allied Chemical,
for example, the Supreme Court held that the terms and conditions of employment of active
employees were not "vitally affected by pensioners' benefits," and that such benefits were
therefore not a mandatory subject of bargaining. 404 U.S. at 182 (emphasis in original).
Borg-Warner and its progeny divided collective bargaining subjects into three categories:
mandatory, permissive, and illegal. See Zimarowski, Interpreting Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments: Silence, Ambiguity, and NLRA Section 8(d), 10 INDUS. REL. L.J. 465, 467 (1988). See
infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the distinction between
mandatory and permissive subjects). For advocacy of the view that the distinction disserves the
NLRA's stated purposes, see Note, Major Operational Decisions and Free Collective Bargaining:
Eliminating the Mandatory/Permissive Distinction, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1971 (1989).
18. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (employer's unilateral changes in merit pay
increases, sick-leave policy and system of automatic wage increases prior to impasse in bargaining
constituted a violation of section 8(a)(5)); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356
U.S. 342 (1958) (employer's insistence upon inclusion of "ballot" and "recognition" clauses,
which were merely permissive subjects, in collective bargaining agreement violated § 8(a)(5)).
Cf. Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967) (negotiations were deadlocked and
parties were further apart than when talks started, so impasse had been reached and unilateral
change in terms and conditions of employment did not violate duty to bargain), review denied
sub nom. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir.
1968). For discussions of bargaining impasse and the significance thereof, see R.GORMAN, BASIC
TEXT ON LABOR LAW 445-50 (1976); Turner, Impasse in the 'Real World' of Labor Relations:
Where Does the Board Stand?, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 468 (1984); Comment, Impasse in
Collective Bargaining, 44 TEX. L. REV. 769 (1966).
In addition to requiring the parties to bargain to impasse, the classification of a particular
subject matter as a mandatory subject of bargaining has other significant consequences for
both the union and the employer. First, the parties may support insistence upon their positions
with economic weapons such as a strike or lockout. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 675
("both employer and union may bargain to impasse over these [mandatory] matters and use
the economic weapons at their disposal to attempt to secure their respective aims." (citing
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952))). Second, the employer must disclose
pertinent information concerning a mandatory subject. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S.
149 (1956). Third, the nature of the remedies for unfair labor practices elevates the parties'
assessment of a given subject to a level of critical significance. An employer who mistakenly
takes the view that a subject is not mandatory but merely permissive "might be faced ultimately
with harsh remedies forcing it to pay large amounts of backpay to employees who likely would
have been discharged regardless of bargaining, or even to consider reopening a failing opera-
tion." First Natl Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 684-85, quoted with approval in, Arrow Automotive
Industries v. NLRB, 853 F.2d 223, 232 (4th Cir. 1988).
Moreover, the union's assessment of the type of subject at issue may bring serious conse-
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employer may lawfully institute unilateral changes which are consistent with
its pre-impasse proposals made to the union. 20 Because it is often difficult
to identify the precise point in time at which an impasse is reached (and
even more difficult to predict how the NLRB will rule in an impasse case),21
section 8(a)(5) stands as a "significant obstacle to an employer who wants
to make a decision that requires major expenditures and clockwork timing
but which nonetheless is the subject of mandatory bargaining. "22
The general standard of mandated bargaining over "terms and conditions
of employment" leaves ample room for the NLRB and the courts to construe
and interpret the Act. 23 The Act entrusts to the Board both the definition
of the duty to bargain as set forth in section 8(a)(5), and the designation
of mandatory subjects of bargaining as defined and set forth in section
8(d). 24 In Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 25 the Supreme Court stated that the
quences to its members. Employees in one bargaining unit who stop work in protest over the
employer's refusal to bargain over, say, subcontracting the work to a second unit-if the
subcontracting decision is held to be a mandatory subject-may have the status of "unfair
labor practice strikers." As such, they may be protected against discharge, and the employer
would have to reinstate them with full backpay. But if the subcontracting decision is only a
permissive subject, the work stoppage may not be protected concerted activity and, accordingly,
the employees may not be protected against discharge. See Turner, supra, at 487-88. As one
commentator put it, "[is it sound legal policy to make such greatly significant liabilities
(backpay in the case of the employer, and job loss in the case of the employees) turn upon
elusive characterization of the subjects of bargaining-often definitively made many months,
and sometimes years, after the event?" A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LABOR LAW 455 (10th ed. 1986).
19. The NLRB considers the following factors in making impasse determinations: (1) the
parties' bargaining history; (2) good faith negotiations; (3) the length of negotiations, (4) the
issues on which the parties disagree; and, (5) the parties' understanding regarding the status of
negotiations. Taft Broadcasting, 163 N.L.R.B. at 478; Turner, supra note 18, at 471 (com-
menting on generality of Taft Broadcasting factors).
20. Katz, 369 U.S. at 744-45; Taft Broadcasting, 163 N.L.R.B. at 478 ("unilateral changes
that are reasonably comprehended within [the employer's] pre-impasse proposals" do not violate
duty to bargain).
21. Turner, supra note 18, at 468-69.
22. Stone, supra note 1, at 88. See, e.g., United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union
v. NLRB, No. 88-1084, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 4, 1989) (employer chose to relocate
between March and October 1981, approximately eight years before appeal of Board ruling was
decided); Arrow Automotive Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 853 F.2d 223, 225 (4th Cir. 1988) ("The
Board thus ordered Arrow to bargain with the union over the closing decision that had been
made six years earlier.").
23. First Nat'l Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 675 (1981) ("Congress deliberately left
the words 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment' without further
definition, for it did not intend to deprive the Board of the power further to define those terms
in light of specific industrial practices."). Accord Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 686 (1965) (courts are able to classify bargaining
subject and NLRB did not have primary (exclusive) jurisdiction over issue whether bargaining
subject was included within "terms or conditions of employment").
24. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979) ("Construing and applying the
duty to bargain and the language of § 8(d), 'other terms and conditions of employment,' are
tasks lying at the heart of the Board's function.").
25. 441 U.S. 488 (1979).
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NLRB's "special expertise" in classifying bargaining subjects as section
8(d) terms and conditions of employment is reason to apply such a defer-
ential standard of review. 26 The federal courts of appeals have accepted
NLRB determinations in this area where the NLRB's "construction of the
statute is reasonably defensible . *."..27 If it is, the Court has instructed
that the NLRB's construction must be accepted and "should not be rejected
merely because the courts might prefer another view of the statute.
2
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S PREDECISION BARGAINING JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court's decisions in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.
NLRB 29 and Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Manufactur-
ing Co.30 represent the polar situations in which mandatory bargaining over
business conduct decisions is and is not required. This part of the Article
discusses these rulings as an introduction to the discussion of First National
Maintenance.
A. The Fibreboard Decision
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,3 1 the Supreme Court held
that the "contracting out" of work previously performed by members of
an existing bargaining unit was a subject over which section 8(a)(5) required
bargaining as defined in section 8(d).3 2 Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing
for the Court, noted that the primary issue before the Court was whether
the employer's contracting out of plant maintenance work, previously per-
formed by unit employees who were capable of continuing to perform the
work, fell within the coverage of section 8(d). Concluding that the contract-
ing matter was within the literal meaning of the phrase "terms and condi-
26. Id. at 495 (the Board's "judgment as to what is a mandatory bargaining subject is
entitled to considerable deference.").
27. Id. at 497 (emphasis added).
28. Id. (citing NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental
Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978)).
29. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
30. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
31. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
32. Id. at 211. In Fibreboard, the company sought to reduce the high cost of its maintenance
operation and informed the union of its plan to obtain substantia savings by contracting out
its maintenance work to an independent contractor when the collective bargaining agreements
with its maintenance employees' unions expired. Id. at 206. The company later terminated its
union-represented maintenance employees and contracted the maintenance work. Id. at 207.
The NLRB initially found no violation of the Act. See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,
130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961). On reconsideration, the NLRB ruled that the employer's failure to
negotiate with the union concerning its subcontracting decision violated § 8(a)(5). Fibreboard
Paper Products Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962). The Board's decision was enforced by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See East Bay Union of
Machinists, Local 1304 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), aff'd sub nom. Fibreboard
Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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tions of employment," the Chief Justice reasoned that to hold subcontracting
a mandatory bargaining subject "would promote the fundamental purpose
of the Act by bringing a problem of vital concern to labor and management
within the framework established by Congress as most conducive to indus-
trial peace." '33
In Chief Justice Warren's view, the facts of Fibreboard illustrated the
propriety of submitting the contracting dispute to bargaining:
The Company's decision to contract out the maintenance work did not
alter the Company's basic operation. The maintenance work still had to
be performed in the plant. No capital investment was contemplated; the
Company merely replaced existing employees with those of an independent
contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment.
Therefore, to require the employer to bargain about the matter would
not significantly abridge his freedom to manage the business.31
The Court's decision also noted that the employer had been concerned
with the labor costs associated with its maintenance operation. According
to Chief Justice Warren, the subcontracting decision was induced by the
assurances of independent contractors that savings would be achieved by
reducing the number of employees, their fringe benefits and overtime.35
Acknowledging that it was "not possible to say whether a satisfactory
solution could be reached" on these issues via bargaining, the Court rea-
soned that "national labor policy is founded upon the congressional deter-
mination that the chances are good enough to warrant subjecting such issues
to the process of collective negotiation. ' 3 6 Expressly limiting its holding to
the type of subcontracting at issue, the Fibreboard Court emphasized that
its decision did not encompass other forms of subcontracting, contracting
out, or a variety of other business arrangements.3 7
Justice Potter Stewart authored an influential concurrence. 38 Indicating
his displeasure with the broad implications of the Court's narrow decision,39
Justice Stewart noted that the Court had not held that all employer decisions
which terminate employment were mandatory subjects of bargaining, nor
that subcontracting in general was such a subject.4 0 Rather, Justice Stewart
33. 379 U.S. at 211.
34. Id. at 213.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 214.
37. id. at 215 & n.8. The Court also enforced the Board's order which called for the
employer to resume its maintenance operations and to reinstate the terminated employees with
back pay. Id. at 215-17.
38. Id. at 217-26 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justices William Douglas and John Harlan
joined in Justice Stewart's concurrence.
39. Id. at 218.
40. Id. (Court did "not decide that every managerial decision which necessarily terminates
an individual's employment is subject to the duty to bargain or . . .that subcontracting decisions
are as a general matter subject to that duty").
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reiterated that the Court's holding was limited to the specific facts of the
case.
41
Justice Stewart's concurrence is best known for the portion of his opinion
in which he set forth three categories for classifying management decisions.
The first category encompassed decisions involving matters which are by
definition working conditions and therefore mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing. These matters included hours of work, the amount of work expected
during those hours, relief periods, safety practices, seniority rights, and
discriminatory discharges. 42 The second category included decisions such as
advertising expenditures, product design, sales, and financing, the impact
of which upon the job security of employees was so "indirect and uncertain"
as to make such decisions only permissive subjects of bargaining 3.4  The
third category comprised those management decisions which eliminate jobs
or at least put job security at risk, 44 but also included "managerial decisions,
which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control." '45
Justice Stewart concluded that where management decisions concerned
the "commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of the enter-
prise," such as in a decision to invest in labor-saving machinery or to
liquidate assets and go out of business, they should be excluded from the
mandatory bargaining requirement. 46 In terms of the employer's limited
duty to bargain under section 8(d), "management decisions which are
fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or which
impinge only indirectly upon employment security should be excluded."
47
The Fibreboard decision generally, and Justice Stewart's analysis in partic-
ular, are key precedents for later decis'ions concerning the issue of whether
an employer's duty to bargain includes the obligation to bargain over
particular subjects.
41. Id. ("The Court holds no more than that this employer's decision to subcontract this
work . . . is subject to the duty to bargain collectively.").
42. Id. at 222.
43. Id. at 223.
44. Id. (employer's action "may quite clearly imperil job security, or indeed terminate
employment entirely").
45. Id. Justice Stewart's scheme of three categories was later adopted by the Supreme Court
in First Nat'l Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676-77 (1981). The courts of appeal routinely
refer to employer decisions which involve the investment of capital and the scope of the business
and also directly impact the relation between employers and employees as "Category 3"
decisions. See, e.g., Local 2179, United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 822 F.2d 559, 574 (5th Cir.
1987) ("Otis H plurality rule requires bargaining for class three management decisions if, but
only if, the decision 'turns upon labor costs."'). This article refers to such decisions both by
description as well as the "Category 3" label.
46. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 223.
47. Id. For examples of lower court adoption of portions of the Stewart analysis, see NLRB
v. Drapery Mfg. Co., 425 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co.,
350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
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B. The Darlington Decision
In the following term, the Court held in Textile Workers Union of
America v. Darlington Manufacturing Co." that an employer has an ab-
solute right to terminate its entire business for any reason, including anti-
union motives. That right, however, does not include the ability to terminate
only part of a business for any reason.4 9 In Darlington, the employer closed
and liquidated one of its facilities after a union won an NLRB representation
election at that facility. The union claimed that the closing was an unfair
labor practice in violation of the NLRAA0 Writing for the Court, Justice
John Harlan noted, preliminarily, that the only issue was whether the closing
had been motivated by anti-union animus and therefore violated section
8(a)(3). Moreover, he stated, there was no independent violation of section
8(a)(1) because the employer had not interfered, restrained or coerced
employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.5 No argument was
presented, however, that section 8(a)(5) required an employer to bargain
over a pure business decision to terminate an enterprise. 2 Therefore, al-
though Darlington is often cited for the proposition that an employer is
not required to bargain over the decision to close a business, 3 the Court
did not directly rule on the section 8(a)(5) aspect of the plant closure
therein.1
4
48. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
49. Id. at 268.
50. Id. at 266-67. The union asserted that the employer violated NLRA §§ 8(a)(1), (3), 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) (1982), by closing the plant, and NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1982), by refusing to bargain over the closing. 380 U.S. at 266-67 & nn.4, 5. The Court,
however, did not decide the section 8(a)(5) issue. Id. at 267 n.5. NLRA § 8 provides in relevant
part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(I) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7; ...
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ...
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) (1982). Section 7 of the Act protects the rights of employees to
organize and join unions, to engage in collective bargaining or "other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection," as well as the right to
refrain from such activities. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). For an overview of NLRA §§ 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3), see Miscimarra, supra note 1, at 100-48.
51. 380 U.S. at 269 ("some employer decisions are so peculiarly matters of management
prerogative that they would never constitute violations of § 8(a)(1), whether or not they involved
sound business judgment, unless they also violated § 8(a)(3).").
52. Id. at 267 n.5.
53. See, e.g., NLRB v. Production Molded Plastics, Inc., 604 F.2d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1979)
(court read Darlington as standing for proposition that complete closing was not a mandatory
subject); Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 564-65 (1966) (NLRB read Darlington as
implying that section 8(a)(5) applies to partial closure decision).
54. 380 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1965). See Note, Mandatory Bargaining and the Disposition of
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Management's prerogatives in Darlington were so clearly involved in the
decision to close the entire business that no interference with employee
rights under the Act was present." Moreover, closing down the entire
business did not violate section 8(a)(3), regardless of management's motive.
Therefore, the Court held that "when an employer closes his entire business;
even if the liquidation is motivated by vindictiveness toward the union, such
action is not an unfair labor practice." '5
6
The key question in Darlington was whether a partial closing may violate
section 8(a)(3). The Court held that only if the employer's motive for the
partial closing was to "chill unionism" in the employer's other locations,
and if such an effect was reasonably foreseen by the employer, would the
partial closing violate section 8(a)(3).1
Thus, at one end of the bargaining continuum, an employer is free to
completely close down its business without violating NLRA section 8(a)(3),
and may be free to close down some facilities without bargaining. At the
other end of the continuum, Fibreboard requires the employer to bargain
about certain subcontracting decisions. In between Fibreboard and Darling-
ton, however, there remained a significant "zone of uncertainty" about
whether employers were statutorily obligated to bargain over "business
conduct decisions," such as decisions to relocate a plant, transfer work, or
partially close business operations for economic or other reasons. 8 One
aspect of this was addressed when the Supreme Court returned to the issue
sixteen years later.
C. The First National Maintenance Decision
In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,5 9 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of predecision bargaining over a partial closing decision.
Closed Plants, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1896, 1906 n.54 (1982) ("The Court explicitly disavowed
ruling on § 8(a)(5)." (citing Darlington, 380 U.S. at 267 n.5)). See also Mid-South Bottling
Co., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 146, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,262 (Feb. 29, 1988) (employer
not exempt from bargaining where decision to close facility was made shortly after union was
certified as employees' exclusive representative, was for anti-union reasons, and therefore
violated § 8(a)(3)).
55. 380 U.S. at 270 ("proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of
business if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation that it should not be
entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal judicial
precedent so construing the Labor Relations Act. We find neither.").
56. Id. at 273-74. The court stated that "[niothing we have said in this opinion would
justify an employer's interfering with employee organizational activities by threatening to close
his plant, as distinguished from announcing a decision to close already reached by the board
of directors or other management authority empowered to make such a decision." Id. at 274
n.20.
57. Id. at 275 ("a partial closing is an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(3) if motivated by
a purpose to chill unionism in any of the remaining plants of the single employer and if the
employer may reasonably have foreseen that such closing would likely have that effect.").
58. Local 2179, United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 822 F.2d 559, 569 (5th Cir. 1987).
59. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
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Aware that it was losing money in performing maintenance work for a
customer, and having unsuccessfully sought an increase in fees from that
customer, the employer, First National Maintenance Corporation, discon-
tinued its operations at the customer's facility and discharged its employees
who had been working there. In making this decision, the employer refused
to bargain with the employees' union about its decision and the effects of
the termination of operations on the employees. Accordingly, the NLRB
ruled that the employer's refusal to bargain violated section 8(a)(5). 60 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enforced the Board's
decision, reasoning that the employer had not rebutted the presumption
that the decision was a mandatory subject of bargaining. 61
In reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court held that the employer
had no duty to bargain with the union regarding its decision to terminate
the contract. Justice Harry Blackmun, writing for the Court, examined the
Act's bargaining framework and the requirement that parties must bargain
over mandatory subjects. He noted, however, that Congress did not intend
the Act's reliance on collective bargaining to make the union "an equal
partner in the running of the business enterprise in which the union's
members are employed." ' 62 Consequently, the Court stated the issue as being
whether the employer's decision was "part of [the employer's] retained
freedom to manage its affairs unrelated to employment. ' 63 Moreover, the
Act's emphasis on collective bargaining is justified only where the subject
of bargaining "is amenable to resolution through the bargaining process. ''64
Management's pursuit of profit and its need for certainty about its duty to
bargain were, in the Court's view, adequate reasons for limiting the duty
to bargain. The Court then formulated a balancing test applicable to partial
closing decisions. As stated by the Court, "[B]argaining . . . should be
60. 242 N.L.R.B. 462 (1979), enf'd, 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 452
U.S. 666 (1981). The NLRB summarily adopted the Administrative Law Judge's ("A.L.J.")
finding that, under Fibreboard, Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966), and Brockway
Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978), the employer's refusal to bargain violated
§ 8(a)(5). "When an employer's work complement is represented by a union and he wishes to
alter the hiring arrangements, be his reason lack of money or a mere desire to become richer,
the law is no less clear that he must first talk to the union about it." First Nat'l Maintenance,
242 N.L.R.B. at 465 (A.L.J.'s opinion).
61. 627 F.2d at 601-02. The Second Circuit, applying an analysis different than that applied
by the A.L.J., reasoned that § 8(d) created a presumption favoring mandatory bargaining over
a partial closure decision. Such a presumption could "be rebutted by showing that the purposes
of the statute would not be furthered by imposition of a duty to bargain." Id. at 601. Examples
of overcoming the presumption offered by the court were futile bargaining situations where it
was clear that the employer's decision could not be changed; closings due to emergency financial
circumstances; industry customs; and endangerment to the vitality of the entire business should
the employer be forced to bargain. See id. at 601-02. For a detailed discussion of the Second
Circuit's approach, see P. MISCIMARRA, THE NLRB AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION, supra note
I, at 146-47.
62. 452 U.S. at 676.
63. Id. at 677.
64. Id. at 678.
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required only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collec-
tive bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the
business.''63
Justice Blackmun compared the interests of union and management in
being involved in or excluded from decisions to close part of a business. In
his view, a union would attempt to delay or prevent the closing and would
offer "concessions, information, and alternatives" toward that end. 66 But
mandatory collective bargaining over management's decision and its effects
does not add to the amount of input from the union. 67 Moreover, in
Blackmun's view, mandatory bargaining over a decision's effects, 68 taken
together with section 8(a)(3), which prohibits partial closings motivated by
anti-union animus, adequately protect the union's interest.
69
Conversely, Justice Blackmun stated that management's interest is more
complex and varied. He opined that if the decision to shut down failing
operations stems in significant part from labor costs, it would be in man-
agement's interest "to confer voluntarily with the union to seek concessions
that may make continuing the business profitable." 70 But, he continued, at
65. Id. at 679. The key passage of the Court's opinion follows:
The concept of mandatory bargaining is premised on the belief that collective
discussions backed by the parties' economic weapons will result in decisions that
are better for both management and labor and for society as a whole. . . .This
will be true, however, only if the subject proposed for discussion is amenable to
resolution through the bargaining process. Management must be free from the
constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a
profitable business. It also must have some degree of certainty beforehand as to
when it may proceed to reach decisions without fear of later evaluations labeling
its conduct an unfair labor practice. . . . [li]n view of an employer's need for
unencumbered decisionmaking, bargaining over management decisions that have a
substantial impact on the continued availability of employment should be required
only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining
process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.
Id. at 678-79 (emphasis added) (footnotes and citations omitted).
66. Id. at 681.
67. Id. ("It is unlikely, however, that requiring bargaining over the decision itself, as well
as its effects, will augment this flow of information and suggestions.")
68. It is well established that an employer is statutorily required to bargain with a union
over the effects of a closure decision, such as seniority, pension, or severance pay issues. See
supra note 3; P. MISCIMARRA, THE NLRB AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION, supra note 1, at 158-
66. See also First Nat'l Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 (1981) ("There is no dispute
that the union must be given a significant opportunity to bargain about" the effects of.closing
decisions); NLRB v. National Car Rental System, Inc., 672 F.2d 1182, 1188 (3d Cir. 1982)
(employer had duty to bargain over transfer of employees to new location after decision to
relocate was made); Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 998 (1957) (effects on employees'
tenure and employment conditions must be bargained over), modified, 124 N.L.R.B. 494 (1959),
enforced sub nom. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 892 (1960).
69. 452 U.S. at 682; accord Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Mfg. Co.,
380 U.S. 263 (1965); see supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
70. 452 U.S. at 682.
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other times management's interest would be in "speed, flexibility, and
secrecy in meeting business opportunities and exigencies" due to tax or
securities law consequences dependent on the timing of a closure, reorgan-
ization of a corporate structure, or confidentiality. 7 Requiring the employer
to bargain over a partial closing decision would only grant the union the
power to delay management's action even absent "any feasible solution the
union might propose." 7 To reinforce his conclusion that bargaining over
partial closing decisions should not be required, Justice Blackmun noted
that collective bargaining agreement provisions granting such bargaining
rights to unions were "relatively rare." ' 73 Finally, Justice Blackmun rejected
the Second Circuit's presumption analysis 74 as ill-suited to advance har-
monious employer-employee relations. He reasoned that case-by-case appli-
cation of presumptions would create uncertainty for employers as to whether
a particular decision was a mandatory subject of bargaining. 7
On the facts of First National Maintenance, the Court held that the
employer's interest in closing part of its business "purely for economic
reasons outweigh[ed]" the marginal benefits to collective bargaining which
could result were the union to participate in decision-making. 76 Therefore,
the Court held that bargaining over this particular decision was not man-
datory. The Court made it clear, however, that it was expressing "no view
as to other types of management decisions, such as plant relocations, sales,
other kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc., which are to be considered
on their particular facts.'' 77
71. Id. at 682-83.
72. Id. at 683.
73. Id. at 684.
74. See supra note 61 for a discussion of First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d
596 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
75. 452 U.S. at 684 (presumption analysis would require an employer to "determin[e]
beforehand whether it was faced with a situation requiring bargaining or one that involved
economic necessity sufficiently compelling to obviate the duty to bargain").
76. Id. at 686 (the employer's partial closing decision was "not part of § 8(d)'s 'terms and
conditions[ ]' . . . over which Congress has mandated bargaining.") (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted).
77. Id. at 686 n.22. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. He disagreed
with the Court's balancing test "because it takes into account only the interests of management;
it fails to consider the legitimate employment interests of the workers and their union." Id. at
689 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Even if the balancing test were accurate,
Justice Brennan found that it was "based solely on speculation." Id. at 690. Stating that he
was "not in a position to judge whether mandatory bargaining over partial closings [was
required] in all cases," Brennan agreed with the Second Circuit "that employers presumptively
have a duty to bargain over" a plant closing decision, a presumption which could "be rebutted
by a showing that bargaining would be futile, that the closing was due to emergency financial
circumstances, or that . . . bargaining would not further the purposes of the [NLRA]." Id. at
691 (emphasis in original).
Justice Brennan's argument that the Court engaged in speculation is on point, for the Court's
focus on abstractions with respect to the possible benefits and burdens of predecision bargaining
went beyond the actual facts presented in First National Maintenance. See George, supra note
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First National Maintenance emphasizes that an employer must enjoy some
certainty in assessing its obligation to bargain with a union over a partial
closing decision.78 However, the Court articulated and adopted a case-by-
case balancing test, applied as a per se rule, 79 which provides that employers
are not required to bargain about partial closing decisions.80 Such an analysis
is inconsistent, confusing, and constitutes a significant point of controversy
raised by the Court's decision."
III. OTIs ELEVATOR II AND ITS PROGENY
Because the First National Maintenance Court restricted its holding to
partial closing decisions and explicitly withheld ruling on any other man-
agement decisions, 2 the question inevitably arose as to the meaning of the
Court's decision in other areas, such as plant relocations, sales, automation,
and subcontracting. The NLRB received the opportunity to address this
question in Otis II.83 As noted below, the NLRA's provisions on collective
bargaining and the Supreme Court's predecision bargaining jurisprudence
were the sources from which the NLRB extracted the principles and fash-
ioned the rules which now govern an employer's obligation to bargain over
various classes of business conduct and entrepreneurial decisions.
A. The Otis Elevator II Decision
The NLRB's first rulings after First National Maintenance mandated
predecision bargaining over plant relocation decisions.8 4 Indeed, the Board
6, at 680. For example, the Court reasoned that an employer's need for speed, flexibility, and
confidentiality must be recognized and protected. However, no such considerations were ap-
parent in First National Maintenance.
78. P. MISCIMARRA, THE NLRB AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION, supra note 1, at 153; George,
supra note 6, at 684-85.
79. See P. MISCIMARA, THE NLRB AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION, supra note 1, at 153;
George, supra note 6, at 680; The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 91, 330
(1981) (the Court "fashioned an apparently per se rule excluding partial closings from the
mandate to bargain").
80. For examples of the courts of appeals' acknowledgement that under First National
Maintenance economically motivated partial closings are not mandatory subjects, see NLRB v.
Local 1199, Nat'l Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 824 F.2d 318, 321 (4th Cir.
1987); Local 2179, United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 822 F.2d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 1987); Serrano
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 790 F.2d 1279, 1286-87 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
549 (1988); International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 181 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Vitek Electronics, Inc. v. NLRB, 763 F.2d 561, 565 n.5 (3d Cir. 1985); Mason v. Continental
Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1087 (1986); NLRB
v. Island Typographers, Inc., 705 F.2d 44, 50 n.8 (2d Cir. 1983).
81. For discussion of this point, see P. MiscImARRA, THE NLRB AND MANAGERIAL DISCRE-
TION, supra note 1, at 153.
82. 452 U.S. at 686 n.22.
83. Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984) ("Otis It").
84. See, e.g., Tocco Div. of Park-Ohio Indus., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 413, 414-15 (1981)
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applied the Court's ruling in First National Maintenance to a 1981 case
which presented the same issue, namely a partial closing decision.85 These
rulings were consistent with earlier Board analysis and precedent,8 6 and
reflected the limited application of First National Maintenance by the
NLRB's General Counsel.87 Then, in Otis 11,88 the NLRB revisited the issue
(employer's decision to transfer work without bargaining violated NLRA); Whitehall Packing
Co., 257 N.L.R.B. 193 (1981) (employer had duty to bargain over decision to transfer unit
work and effects of decision). These decisions, which were issued approximately one month
after First National Maintenance, did not mention the Court's decision. See also Bob's Big
Boy Family Restaurants, 264 N.L.R.B. 1369, 1371-72 (1982) (failure to bargain about decision
to close shrimp processing operation and subcontract work to outside company unlawful); Ford
Bros., Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 92, 102-03 (1982) (A.L.J. opinion) (with no mention of First National
Maintenance, the NLRB ruled that the employer violated § 8(a)(5) by failing to bargain about
its decision to transfer work from Ohio to West Virginia; anti-union animus was also a factor);
Carbonex Coal Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1306, 1307 n.2 (1982) ("An employer may not simply shut
down part of its business and mask its desire to weaken and circumvent the union by labeling
its decision 'purely economic."'(quoting First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 682)).
85. See U.S. Contractors, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 1180 (1981) (Board ruled that employer's pre-
election conduct violated § 8(a)(1) and that partial closure of business was not mandatory
subject), enforcement denied, 697 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1983) (court held that settlement agreement
entered into by parties estopped Board from litigating pre-settlement conduct including partial
termination of business after contested election).
86. Professor B. Glenn George has noted that an employer's right to relocate work when
the decision is based on economic considerations may have been initially recognized by the
NLRB in the 1950s. George, supra note 6, at 681 n.72 (citing Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109
N.L.R.B. 1045, 1055 (1954), enf'd sub nom. NLRB v. Tredway, 222 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1955)).
Professor George also notes that in 1941, in Gerity Whitaker Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 393 (1941),
enforced as modified, 137 F.2d 198 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 763 (1943),
and Brown-McLaren Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 984 (1941), the employers' failures to bargain
about decisions to relocate unit work were held to be unlawful. See George, supra note 6, at
682.
87. In July 1981, former NLRB General Counsel William A. Lubbers issued a memorandum
recognizing the potential application of First National Maintenance to management decisions.
See NLRB General Counsel on Duty to Bargain Cases I, reprinted in 1981 Labor Relations
Yearbook (BNA) 312-14 (1982) (NLRB General Counsel Guideline Memorandum GC 81-38,
July 14, 1981). In November 1981, Lubbers issued another memorandum which instructed
NLRB Regions to apply the First National Maintenance balancing test to the types of manage-
ment decisions referred to by the Court in that case, including work relocations. See NLRB
General Counsel on Duty to Bargain Cases II, reprinted in 1981 Labor Relations Yearbook
(BNA), supra, at 315-17 (NLRB General Counsel Guideline Memorandum GC 81-57, Nov. 30,
1981). Lubbers stated that a weighing of factors which would make bargaining burdensome
against the benefit for labor-management relations and collective bargaining should be under-
taken in cases involving decisions to relocate, subcontract, automate or consolidate. Id. at 316.
88. Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984). This NLRB decision reversed the Board's
earlier decision in Otis Elevator Co., 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981) [hereinafter Otis 1, wherein the
NLRB decided that the employer unlawfully refused to bargain with the union over the decision
to close and consolidate certain research work and programs. That case was decided by former
Chairman John Fanning and former Members Howard Jenkins and Don Zimmerman. While
Otis I was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, the NLRB moved for a remand of the case for reconsideration in light of First National
Maintenance. That motion was granted in August 1981. Otis I1, 269 N.L.R.B. at 891.
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of whether an employer must bargain over an economically based decision
to relocate work. United Technologies Corporation had acquired Otis Ele-
vator Company in 1975 and decided to consolidate all its research and
development operations in Connecticut. As a result of the consolidation,
Otis Elevator's research operations at two New Jersey locations were ter-
minated.89
1. The Plurality Opinion
In a plurality opinion, former Chairman Donald Dotson and former
Member Robert Hunter concluded that the employer's decision to discon-
tinue the use of one research facility and transfer the work to another
facility was not subject to mandatory bargaining. Quoting the passage in
First National Maintenance which sets forth the Supreme Court's balancing
test, 9° the plurality stated that the employer's decision, "[g]ood or bad,"
was beyond the reach of section 8(d). 91 The decision to close the facility
was based on its obsolete technology and noncompetitive product, the
duplicative research and development operations which resulted from having
two facilities, and the availability of a new and larger research center. The
plurality noted that the employer's decision also stemmed from an evaluation
of the different. facilities, and that labor costs might have been among the
circumstances that led to the evaluation. The employer's decision itself,
however, was based on a comparison of the facilities, and it "did not turn
upon labor costs .... ,,92 Although the employer's decision affected its
employees, the test is whether the decision "turns upon a change in the
nature or direction of the business, or turns upon labor costs; not its effect
on employees nor a union's ability to offer alternatives." 93 Because the
decision at issue in Otis II "clearly turned upon a fundamental change in
the nature and direction of the business," the plurality determined that the
decision was not subject to mandatory collective bargaining. 94
Elaborating on their decision, Dotson and Hunter expressly relied on
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Fibreboard and his view that the
bargaining obligation of section 8(d) did not extend to "Category 3"
management decisions which are fundamental to the direction of the cor-
porate enterprise or which indirectly impinge on employment security.95
Relying as well on the First National Maintenance Court's analysis with
89. 269 N.L.R.B. at 892.
90. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the balancing test
established in First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. 666, 678-79 (1981).
91. 269 N.L.R.B. at 892.
92. Id. ("These facts establish that the ...[employer's] decision did not turn upon labor
costs even though that factor may have been one of the circumstances which stimulated the
evaluation process which generated the decision. "(footnote omitted)).
93. Id. (emphasis in original).
94. Id.
95. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of "Category 3" decisions.
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regard to management's need for certainty, flexibility, speed, and secrecy,
the plurality held that section 8(d) does not apply to decisions affecting the
scope, direction, or nature of a business. 96 The label given to the decision,
however, was not important to Dotson and Hunter; bargaining is required
only where the employer's decision turns upon labor costs. Thus, under the
Dotson-Hunter analysis, the duty to bargain under section 8(d) attaches to
managerial decisions, whether characterized as subcontracting, reorganiza-
tion, consolidation, or relocation, only "if the decision in fact turns on
direct modification of labor costs and not on a change in the basic direction
or nature of the enterprise." 97
2. The Dennis Formulation
Concurring in the result, former Member Patricia Diaz Dennis did not
agree with the plurality's analysis regarding the test for determining man-
datory subjects of bargaining. Relying on First National Maintenance,
Dennis constructed a separate framework utilizing a two-part analysis ap-
plicable to the type of managerial decisions that fell into Fibreboard's third
category. 98 That category, which Dennis stated refers to decisions impacting
directly on employment and which are focused only on the "economic
profitability" of the employer's operation, includes employer decisions on
''plant relocations, consolidations, automation, and subcontracting. "99
The first part of the Dennis analysis involves determining whether the
employer's decision is amenable to resolution through bargaining. The key
question posed by Dennis is as follows: "Is a factor over which the union
has control (e.g., labor costs) a significant consideration in the employer's
decision?"'0 Dennis defined the "significant consideration" factor as one
over which the union was "in a position to lend assistance or offer con-
cessions" which could "make a difference" in the employer's decision.101
Thus, stated Dennis, bargaining is not required where decisions are based
on factors over which the union has no control, or where the union has
control over only insignificant factors.
96. 269 N.L.R.B. at 893. Included among these decisions are selling all or part of a business;
disposal of assets; restructuring or consolidation of operations; subcontracting; investment in
labor-saving machinery; changes in the methods of finance or sales; advertising; product design;
and "all other decisions akin to the foregoing." Id. at 893 n.5.
97. Id. at 893. Finding that the employer's decision did not turn upon labor costs, the
plurality dismissed the decision bargaining allegations of the complaint, and remanded the
effects-bargaining allegations to the A.L.J. for further consideration. Id. at 895.
98. 269 N.L.R.B. at 895 (Dennis, Member, concurring). Dennis noted the three categories
of management decisions set forth in Justice Stewart's Fibreboard concurrence which were also
recognized by the Supreme Court in First National Maintenance. See supra notes 42-47 and
accompanying text.
99. 269 N.L.R.B. at 897 (Dennis, Member, concurring).
100. Id. The plurality also recognized that labor costs are often among the considerations
which management examines in these cases. Id. at 894.
101. Id. at 897.
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If the first part of the test is met, the second part of the Dennis analysis
requires weighing the degree to which the decision is amenable to bargaining
against the burden of the bargaining process on management. 1 02 This burden
element includes the extent of capital commitment or of changes in opera-
tions, and the need for speed, flexibility, and confidentiality.0 3 Dennis also
placed the burden on the General Counsel of the Board to prove that: (1)
"a factor over which the union has control was a significant consideration
in the employer's decision"; and, (2) the benefit for the bargaining process
outweighed the burden of bargaining on the business. 0 4
Applying her analytical framework to the employer's decision to consol-
idate its research operations in Otis II, Member Dennis concluded that it
clearly fell within the second category of the Fibreboard-First National
Maintenance formulation-it was an employer's decision which was not
amenable to bargaining. Finding that none of the factors motivating the
employer's decision in Otis II were within the union's control, Dennis
determined that no labor-related considerations underlay the decision. For
example, union proposals to cut pay or benefits or to work overtime to
increase productivity would not have provided updated technology. Nor
could union employee guarantees have improved design concepts, offered
alternative solutions to the employer's duplicative engineering facilities, or
changed the fact that the parent company was located in Connecticut rather
than New Jersey. Dennis agreed, therefore, that the employer's decision
was not amenable to resolution through collective bargaining, and concurred
in the plurality's dismissal of that allegation of the Union's complaint.' 5
Dennis went on to explain that she would not have necessarily concluded
that the decision was a mandatory bargaining subject even if labor costs
had been a significant consideration in the decision. 1°6 If labor costs had
been key, Dennis stated, balancing the "benefit" against the "burden"
would have nevertheless obligated the General Counsel to prove that the
amenability of the decision to resolution through bargaining outweighed the
constraints which bargaining places on management. 07 Because the employ-
er's decision involved a substantial capital investment' 8 and a significant
change in operations, Member Dennis agreed with the plurality that the
employer had not violated the Act by refusing to engage in predecision
bargaining.
3. The Zimmerman Position
Former Member Don Zimmerman agreed with the plurality and Member
Dennis that the employer had not violated section 8(a)(5) by not bargaining
102. Id. See also First Nat'l Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981) (setting forth
the Court's "balancing" test).
103. 269 N.L.R.B. at 897 (citing First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 679, 680, 682-83, 688).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 899-900.
106. Id. at 900.
107. Id.
108. See First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 688.
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over its decision. In his view, an employer's decision which is motivated by
labor costs is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Unlike the plurality,
however, Zimmerman would not confine an employer's bargaining obliga-
tion simply to decisions which turn on labor costs. 0 9 If the union can affect
the employer's decision in those situations, Zimmerman's formulation would
require the employer to bargain in the absence of a showing of the em-
ployer's need for speed, flexibility, or secrecy." 0 According to Zimmerman,
the union in Otis II could not have affected the employer's decision because
no union concession could have altered the employer's concerns. Those
concerns were entrepreneurial in scope and did not translate directly into
dollar figures. Thus, Zimmerman concluded that the employer's decision
was outside the scope of the mandatory bargaining obligation."'
4. The Meaning of Otis II
The Otis II plurality reviewed the Supreme Court's Fibreboard and First
National Maintenance rulings and derived a "business direction-labor costs"
dichotomy which excluded the employer's entrepreneurial decision from the
scope of section 8(d)."12 The Board's conclusion largely draws support from
the Supreme Court's language in the cases mentioned above. However, the
Board plurality's labor costs standard went beyond the Court's analysis of
whether an employer's decision was amenable to bargaining based on an
examination of the underlying reasons for the decision. 3 The concept of
an entrepreneurial decision is vague, and the labor costs standard does not
require the explicit balancing of the benefits and burdens of bargaining as
set forth in First National Maintenance. " 4
Although each of the Otis II opinions relied on and applied the reasoning
in First National Maintenance, the plurality (Chairman Dotson and Member
Hunter) and Member Zimmerman did not expressly acknowledge the Su-
preme Court's balancing test. The Dotson-Hunter labor costs standard may
be predictable and is perhaps easier to apply, but it appears to be narrower
from the union's viewpoint than the First National Maintenance test, because
it would apparently exclude from mandatory bargaining those decisions
where labor costs were not the sole reason for the decision. Similarly,
Member Zimmerman, who did not adopt the Dotson-Hunter position and
109. Otis II, 269 N.L.R.B. at 900-01 ("A decision may be amenable to resolution through
bargaining where the employer's decision is related to overall enterprise costs not limited
specifically to labor costs.") (Zimmerman, Member, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I10. Id. at 901.
11l. Member Zimmerman dissented from the Board's remand of the effects-bargaining issue.
Id. at 901.
112. See Modjeska, The Reagan NLRB, Phase 1, 46 Omo ST. L.J. 95, 115 (1985) ("The
Board also extracts from Fibreboard and First National [Maintenance] a business direction-





instead would have required an analysis of a decision's amenability to
bargaining, also did not call for weighing the burden of bargaining on the
conduct of the employer's business. Zimmerman's test was broader than
the plurality's test, but was also an "either/or" analysis which excused the
bargaining obligation (once the amenability threshold was met) only where
the employer's need for speed, flexibility, or confidentiality was estab-
lished." '5
In contrast, Member Dennis articulated an approach which drew on the
First National Maintenance balancing test. She would apply the balancing
test only if a threshold test was met-whether the employer's decision was
amenable to resolution through bargaining. Where that threshold is met,
Dennis would then balance the benefits and burdens of bargaining.
Despite the plurality's adoption of the labor costs standard, the NLRB
Regional offices were initially instructed to investigate Otis H-type cases in
a manner consistent with the balancing analysis articulated in First National
Maintenance. In June 1984, Acting General Counsel (and former NLRB
Member) Wilford Johansen issued a guideline memorandum ("Memoran-
dum")" 6 which required Regional offices to investigate and assess the
following matters:
(1) a complete description of the change, including particularly whether
it is part of a larger change involving other parts of the enterprise;
(2) the underlying reasons for the change;
(3) whether, in the context of those reasons and
the relationship between the parties, the decision was amenable to reso-
lution through the process of collective bargaining; and,
(4) what, if any, burdens would bargaining place on the employer.",
Upon completion of the investigation, the Memorandum provided that
the Regions were to resolve these issues:
(1) Does the decision involve a change in the nature and direction of a
significant facet of the enterprise?
(2) What are the reasons lying behind the decision?
(3) Is the decision amenable to resolution through the process of collective
bargaining and, if so, do the benefits of bargaining outweigh the burdens
that bargaining would place on the employer?" 8
To assist the Regions in making their determinations, the Memorandum
provided a chart which is set forth in the Table below." 9 The chart reflects
115. George, supra note 6, at 694 ("If the amenability test is met, Member Zimmerman
would excuse the duty to bargain only if the employer's need for speed, flexibility, or confi-
dentiality is 'urgent,' a concept not found in [First Nat'l Maintenance].") (footnote omitted).
116. See NLRB General Counsel on Otis Elevator Guidelines, reprinted in 1984 Labor
Relations Yearbook (BNA) 363-66 (1985) (NLRB General Counsel Guideline Memorandum GC
84-12, June 14, 1984).
117. Id. at 365.
118. Id. at 365-66.
119. Id. at 365.
1989]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
the reality that, notwithstanding the Otis II plurality's labor costs approach,
the NLRB General Counsel would continue to investigate this class of cases
under a balancing test which recognized the employer's motivation with
respect to labor costs as only one part of the formula. As noted in the
Memorandum, the General Counsel concluded that many areas fall on the



























No Yes Yes Mandatory
No No Yes Arguably
Mandatory
No Yes No Arguably
Mandatory
No No No Nonmandatory
Yes Yes Yes Arguably
Mandatory
Yes No Yes Arguably
Mandatory
Yes Yes No Nonmandatory
Yes No No Nonmandatory
In examining the progeny of Otis II, one must focus on the status of each
of the preceding views in light of the questions remaining open after the
Board's ruling. In particular, the next section considers whether, after Otis
II, an additional Board member adopted the Dotson-Hunter view, thereby
creating a majority position, or whether the Dennis or Zimmerman positions
found support, thereby clouding the picture of what is required of an
employer in making decisions to relocate, subcontract, or consolidate its
operations. The question of whether the General Counsel continued to take




the labor costs standard as indicated in the General Counsel's Memorandum
discussed above, will also be considered.
B. The Progeny of Otis 1I
1. 1984-1985 Rulings
In the first post-Otis II decisions, Board Members applied their separate
Otis H opinions and approaches to reach the same results in most cases.
Those NLRB decisions applying Otis H during this period illustrate the
absence of a majority view with respect to the application of either the
"business direction-labor costs" dichotomy, or the "amenability to bargain"
and "benefits-burden balancing" approach.
For example, the Board held that one employer who closed a machine
shop and subcontracted out the work did not violate section 8(a)(5) because
the decision was motivated by a recession, lack of business, and the need
for substantial capital in order to modernize.12 0 Chairman Dotson and Mem-
ber Hunter concluded that the facts established that the employer's decision
turned on a fundamental change in the nature and direction of the business. 2 1
Concurring, Member Zimmerman agreed that the employer's decision was
not a mandatory subject of bargaining, because the factors influencing its
decision were factors over which the union had little or no control. 22
Similarly, the Board concluded in another case that an employer's decision
to consolidate and subcontract its operations and transfer work was not a
mandatory subject of bargaining. 23 Dotson and Hunter found that the
employer was merely attempting to restore the enterprise to economic viability
by reducing operating costs, eliminating the duplication of work, costs and
services, and was responding to the deterioration of the quality of its product
caused by obsolete equipment. Thus, Dotson and Hunter concluded that the
employer's decision did not turn on labor costs "although such costs were
a factor" in the decision. 24 Member Dennis agreed, concluding that in light
of the factors raised by the employer, its decision was not amenable to
bargaining.' 5
120. Fraser Shipyards, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 496 (1984).
121. Id. at 497. In so concluding, they acknowledged that the employer had testified at the
unfair labor practice hearing that employee wages and benefits placed it at an economic
disadvantage; nevertheless they reasoned that "this factor did not prompt the [employer's]
action." Id. at 496-97.
122. Id. at 497 (Zimmerman, Member, concurring) ("To the extent that labor costs were a
factor, it is evident . . . that those costs were an insignificant consideration in the [employer's]
decision.").
123. Bostrom Division, UOP Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 999 (1984).
124. Id. at 1000.
125. Id. at 1000-01 (Dennis, Member, concurring in the result). To the extent that labor
costs were a factor, Dennis reasoned that such costs were an insignificant consideration. Id. at
1001. See also Kroger Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 462 (1984) (employer decision to close facility and
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A Board panel consisting of Chairman Dotson and Members Hunter and
Dennis again applied their separate approaches to arrive at the same result
in a case which arose from an employer's decision to subcontract installation
work due to a large influx of work orders. 2 6 Applying their Otis II analysis,
Dotson and Hunter found that the decision affected the scope of the business
and was therefore not bargainable.127 Agreeing with that result, Member
Dennis relied on her Otis II concurrence and concluded that the subcon-
tracting decision had only an indirect and attenuated impact on the employ-
ment relationship. 28
The same panel split, however, in a similar subcontracting case where the
employer had agreed to retain an independent contractor to provide it with
maintenance and service work. 12 9 Applying the Otis H labor costs standard,
Dotson and Hunter held that the decision turned not upon labor costs, but
upon a significant change in the nature and direction of the business because
the employer's purpose in subcontracting was to reduce its overhead costs
across the board. Although labor costs were one component of overhead
costs, 130 the employer had no intention of performing the service work with
its own employees. The majority therefore concluded that there was no duty
to bargain under Otis II. 'i
Dissenting in part, Member Dennis concluded that the employer's subcon-
tracting decision was a mandatory bargaining subject. She reasoned that the
subcontractor performed the same work that the employer's employees
performed, and used the same tools and equipment in the same work area.
Dennis applied her two-part Otis II analysis to find, first, that the subcon-
tracting decision was amenable to resolution through bargaining. In her view,
the union could have made offers that would have reasonably affected the
employer's decision, since labor costs were a component of the costs which
the employer sought to reduce. Second, Dennis found no significant change
subcontract operations centered on scarcity of raw materials and outmoded facility; thus,
decision is not subject to mandatory bargaining); Columbia City Freight Lines, 271 N.L.R.B.
12 (1984) (decision to close trucking terminal and consolidate operations not subject to man-
datory bargaining where employer sought to reduce costs, eliminate duplication of services, and
maximize usage of equipment and fuel).
126. Ausable Communications, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1985).
127. Id. at 1410.
128. Id. at 1410 n.3.
129. Garwood-Detroit Truck Equip. Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 113 (1985). The independent con-
tractor also agreed to pay a percentage of the employer's rent and utility bills and to provide
liability and other insurance for the employer. Notifying the employees and union of the
subcontracting, the employer stated that it was eliminating the subcontracted operations to
prevent economic chaos and because of astronomical losses. Id. at 113. The A.L.J., concluding
that the case was governed by Fibreboard, found that the employer was obligated to bargain
about its decision. Id. at 115.
130. Id. (agreement offered employer a wide variety of financial relief, including the "obvious
savings in payroll costs . .").
131. Id. However, the NLRB found that the employer unlawfully failed to bargain with the
union about the effects of the subcontracting decision on unit employees. Id. at Il-16.
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in the nature and direction of the employer's business because the same
work was being performed at the same location for the same customers.
Dennis therefore concluded that the benefits of bargaining outweighed any
burden placed on management.3 2
After these initial post-Otis II rulings, the Board sought to clarify the
labor costs standard, beginning with a case in which Dotson, Hunter and
Dennis agreed that the employer had violated section 8(a)(5) by not bar-
gaining over a subcontracting decision.' Dotson and Hunter determined
that the employer's decision turned upon labor costs (which was the reason
that it ended its relationship with its joint employer) and that these costs
entered into its new relationship with the contracting employer. 3 4 Further-
more, the Board found that there was no change in the nature or direction
of the business; the only difference being that the employer used a different
group of employees for the same operations. Applying her Otis II analysis,
Member Dennis agreed that labor costs were a significant consideration in
the employer's decision. She further found that the benefit of bargaining
outweighed its burden because the employer's decision involved no capital
commitment, virtually no change in operations, and involved no evidence of
a need for speed, flexibility, or confidentiality."'
The same panel held that an employer was not obligated to bargain over
its decision to close and transfer its delivery operation after losing a major
customer and fifty to seventy-percent of its business. 3 6 Although the NLRB's
administrative law judge ("A.L.J.") found that labor costs were a motivating
factor in the decision, the Board nonetheless declared that the decision must
turn on labor costs. In particular, the Board stated that labor costs "must
be more than merely 'one of the circumstances which stimulated the evalu-
ation process' . . . for a bargaining obligation to attach."'3 17 Joining in the
result, Member Dennis stated that the reason for the transfer of the delivery
operation-the loss of a major customer-was wholly outside of the union's
control. Thus, the union could have lent no assistance nor offered any
concessions which could have ;easonably affected the employer's decision., 8
Yet another case involved subcontracting which was expressly implemented
because of employee wages and benefits, the employer's inability to afford
132. Id. at 117 (Dennis, Member, dissenting in part) (citing First Nat'l Maintenance Corp.
v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679-80 (1981)). Member Dennis agreed with the majority that the
employer unlawfully failed to engage in effects-bargaining.
133. Clinton's Ditch Coop. Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 728 (1985), enforcement denied, 778 F.2d
132 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, Teamster's Local 317 v. Clinton's Ditch Coop. Co., 479 U.S.
814 (1986).
134. Id. at 729 ("labor costs were a key consideration.
135. Id. at 729 n.5 (Dennis, Member, concurring).
136. Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. 339 (1985). The NLRB determined that this
loss was the principal reason for the employer's decision. Id. at 341.
137. Id. (quoting Otis II, 269 N.L.R.B. at 892).
138. Id. at 344 n.l (Dennis, Member, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the luxury of in-house labor, and the need to reduce employee related costs. 13 9
It was clear to the Board that the employer's decision to subcontract turned
upon labor costs and was therefore bargainable. Concurring in the result,
Member Dennis found that the employer's reasons revealed that labor costs
were a significant consideration in the subcontracting decision, a decision
which did not represent a significant change in business operations or present
the burden elements of the need for speed or confidentiality.'40
The foregoing decisions reveal the adherence of former Chairman Dotson
and former Member Hunter to the labor costs standard and offer examples
of the questions and quanta of proof necessary to establish a violation under
Otis I. Dotson and Hunter continued to require the isolation of labor costs
as the only possible rationale for a decision, and as a prerequisite to a
finding of unlawful refusal to predecision bargain. Member Dennis agreed
with the panel majority in most cases, and only parted company with Dotson
and Hunter where the employer was subcontracting work which would be
performed at the same location for the same company customers. In doing
so, Dennis continued to apply the two-part analysis set forth in her Otis II
concurrence and took a broader look at the issues underlying the employer's
decision.
2. Selected Recent Rulings
a. Initial adherence to the Dotson-Hunter labor costs standard
Changes in the NLRB's membership introduced yet another factor relative
to Otis II analysis, and presented the question of whether the Dotson-Hunter
or Dennis formulations, or some variation thereof, would win out. For
example, former Member Marshall Babson joined Chairman Dotson and
Member Dennis to find no duty to bargain over an employer's relocation
decision.' 4 In that case, the employer had decided to transfer work previously
done at a repair shop. The employer also decided to close the repair shop
because of technological developments in machinery and a major reduction
in repair work needed by the company. 142 Reasoning that the employer's
decision turned not upon labor costs, but upon a change in the nature and
139. Griffith-Hope Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 487 (1985).
140. Id. at 489 (Dennis, Member, concurring in the result). For other examples of the
application of Otis II during this time period, see Oak Rubber Co., 277 N.L.R.B. 1322 (1985)
(former Members Johansen and Marshall Babson relied on First Nat'l Maintenance and any of
the views expressed in Otis II); Mack Trucks, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 711 (1985) (employer's decision
to close plant and transfer work not mandatory subject of bargaining); Griffith-Hope Co., 275
N.L.R.B. 487 (1985) (employer violated Act by subcontracting without first bargaining with
the union); Nurminco, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 764 (1985), enforced, 786 F.2d 1170 (8th Cir. 1986)
(employer obligated to bargain over decision to lay off bargaining unit employees and distribute
their work to nonbargaining unit employees).
141. Drummond Coal Co., 277 N.L.R.B. 1618 (1986).
142. Id. at 1618-19.
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direction of a significant facet of its business, the Board held that the
decision was excluded from section 8(d) bargaining. Member Dennis con-
curred in the result applying her Otis II analysis. "3 Member Babson also
agreed with the decision, concluding that the ruling was consistent with First
National Maintenance and "with any of the views expressed in Otis Eleva-
tor." " Interestingly, Babson adhered to that view throughout his tenure
with the NLRB.
Furthermore, in yet another transfer case, the Board held that an em-
ployer's transfer of work was a mandatory subject of bargaining because
the transfer was undertaken for the sole purpose of escaping the employer's
wage obligations under an existing collective bargaining agreement. 45 Mem-
ber Babson joined Chairman Dotson and Member Dennis, again stressing
that the Board's conclusion was consistent with First National Maintenance
and any of the views expressed in Otis I. 4 6
b. The trend away from the labor costs standard as the dispositive test
Former Board Member Johansen also entered the picture in 1986. Con-
sidering the employer's transfer of work in Morco Industries, Inc.,, 47 he
agreed with Dotson and Dennis that the employer had not violated the Act
by bypassing predecision bargaining. In reaching that result, the Board noted
that the employer's physical plant had reached its limits for expansion, and
that the employer lost orders because of a lack of facilities. In addition to
the employer's capital investment and increased capacity, the Board noted
that the employer did not attempt to undermine the union or escape con-
tractual labor costs. 48
One notable aspect of Morco is the absence of the labor costs language
and analysis found in previous decisions issued by Dotson and Hunter. The
Morco panel instead engaged in a more expansive review of the facts
underlying the employer's decision. That change may be attributable to the
fact that Johansen did not subscribe to the "business direction-labor costs"
143. Id. at 1619 n.4 (Dennis, Member, concurring in the result).
144. Id. at 1619 n.3. Interestingly, the NLRB deferred the issue of whether the employer
failed to engage in effects-bargaining to the arbitrator. See id. at 1619-20. The NLRB's deference
to arbitration doctrine was first stated in Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955) and
was refined in Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
145. Brown Co., 278 N.L.R.B. 783 (1986), remanded without opinion, 833 F.2d 1015 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1602 (1988).
146. 278 N.L.R.B. at 785 n.7. The Board also held that the employer's midterm modification
of the contract violated § 8(a)(5). Id. at 785; see Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984),
aff'd sub nom. International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
For other examples of applications of Otis II, see Metropolitan Teletronics Corp., 279
N.L.R.B. 957 (1986), enforced without opinion, Metro Tele-Tronics v. NLRB, 819 F.2d 1130
(2d Cir. 1987); DeSoto, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 788 (1986).
147. 279 N.L.R.B. 762 (1986).
148. Id. at 763.
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dichotomy of the Otis II plurality. Thus, the opinions of Dennis149 and
Johansen are reflected in the tone and analysis set forth in Morco. The
notion that the labor costs standard was no longer the dominant view had
suddenly surfaced, a notion that would ultimately be confirmed in later
Board decisions.
The trend away from the Dotson-Hunter labor costs standard as the
dispositive analysis continued in decisions issued by the Board throughout
1987. For example, the Board considered an employer's decision to terminate
its trucking operations and subcontract unit work without bargaining with
the union.1 0 There, the A.L.J. applied the Otis I plurality test in concluding
that the subcontracting was a mandatory bargaining subject in that the
decision turned upon labor costs rather than a change in the nature and
direction of the business. Agreeing with the A.L.J., Members Babson and
Johansen found it "unnecessary in this case to choose among [the Otis II]
tests since in their view the same result is dictated regardless of which test
is applied."'' Babson and Johansen reasoned that the case was governed
by Fibreboard, and concluded that it was clear that had the employees agreed
to a wage freeze, the work would not have been subcontracted. The employer
neither closed part of its business nor changed the scope or direction of the
enterprise, and still provided truck delivery service to its clients. Thus, as in
Fibreboard, the employer "merely replaced existing workers with those of
an independent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of
employment."' 52 Concurring, Chairman Dotson argued for application of
the plurality decision he and Member Hunter issued in Otis II. Because he
concluded that the employer's decision turned upon labor costs, Dotson
agreed that the subcontracting decision was a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing. 15
In another case, the Board Members relied on First National Maintenance,
as well as all the views of Otis II, to hold that an employer was obligated
to bargain over its subcontracting and relocation decisions. 54 A consultant's
cost study projected that the employer could save $2.6 million in manufac-
turing costs, $2 million of which was attributed to labor costs, if certain
work was subcontracted. That fact, plus the absence of change in product,
manufacturing process, or production technology, led the NLRB to conclude
that the bargaining obligation attached. Member (now Chairman) James
Stephens and Member Johansen stated that this conclusion was consistent
149. Dennis again relied on her Otis II concurrence. See id. at 763 n.3.
150. Century Air Freight, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 1986-1987 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 18,933
(June 30, 1987).
151. Id. slip op. at 9, 1986-1987 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 32,461.
152. Id. slip op. at 12, 1986-1987 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 32,462 (quoting Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 213 (1964)).
153. Id. slip op. at 17, 1986-1987 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 32,463.
154. Roytype Div., Pertec Computer Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 1986-1987 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) 18,874 (June 30, 1987).
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with First National Maintenance and all the views of Otis IL 55 Only Chair-
man Dotson relied on the labor costs standard of Otis 11.156
Johansen, Babson and Stephens continued their reliance on First National
Maintenance and all of the Otis H analyses in subsequent cases.157 For
example, Johansen and Stephens held to their view, in the face of a Dotson
dissent, in Plymouth Stamping Div., Eltec Corp. 58 Finding that the employer
unlawfully failed to bargain over a transfer and subcontracting decision,
Johansen and Stephens reasoned that, the decision was bargainable under
any of the views of Otis II, including the labor costs standard of the Otis
H plurality opinion. In their view, the employer's decision turned upon labor
costs because "had the [employer] obtained the specific cost concessions it
desired, it would not have transferred its parts assembly operation . ... ,9
Unlike previous decisions, Johansen and Stephens attempted to demon-
strate in Plymouth Stamping how the other views expressed in Otis H applied.
The first part of the Dennis analysis 60 was satisfied because labor costs were
a significant factor in the employer's decision. As to the second part of the
Dennis balancing test, the employer's subcontracting decision did not involve
a substantial capital commitment nor depend on a need for confidentiality.
Nor were flexibility and speed obstacles to bargaining. Thus, Johansen and
Stephens concluded that the benefit derived from bargaining outweighed the
burden which bargaining imposed on the employer. 16 1 The Zimmerman
view 162 W ould also require bargaining, they stated, for the employer's attempts
to obtain concessions "demonstrate[d] that the union could reasonably have
been expected to respond to the [employer's] concerns and alter" the em-
ployer's plans.163
155. Id. slip op. at 5, 1986-1987 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 32,297.
156. Id. slip op. at 5 n.4, 1986-1987 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 32,297 n.4.
157. See, e.g., Land Air Delivery, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
19,186 (Nov. 27, 1987) (employer unlawfully contracted out all unit work, a mandatory
subject, instead of replacing strikers), review denied, 862 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Michigan
Ladder Co., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,082 (Sept. 30, 1987)
(under any of the views expressed in Otis I, the employer violated § 8(a)(5) by contracting out
unit work without bargaining with the union); Westinghouse Broadcasting and Cable, Inc., 285
N.L.R.B. No. 32, 1986-1987 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 18,899 (July 1, 1987) (same), enforced, 849
F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1988).
158. 286 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,088 (Nov. 19, 1987), enforced,
870 F.2d 1112 (6th Cir. 1989).
159. Id. slip op. at 7, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 32,881. The employer had informed
the union that to keep jobs in the plant it would need substantial wage reductions, a freeze on
cost of living adjustments, reduced health benefits, a decrease in paid holidays, relief from
certain work rules, and changes in the grievance procedure. Id.
160. See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two-step analysis
articulated by Member Dennis' concurring opinion in Otis I.
161. 286 N.L.R.B. No. 85, slip op. at 9 n.8, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 32,881-82 n.8.
162. See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of Member Zimmer-
man's concurring opinion in Otis II.
163. 286 N.L.R.B. No. 85, at 9 n.8, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 32,881-82 n.8.
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Chairman Dotson dissented from the majority's holding that the employer
had unlawfully failed to bargain. He concluded that the employer's decision
did not turn upon labor costs, although such costs were considered, because
the employer's subcontracting was an attempt to restore the enterprise to
economic viability.' 64Accordingly, Dotson concluded that the employer had
no obligation to bargain.
With the expiration of Chairman Dotson's term, the last of the original
and principal proponents of the labor costs standard departed from the
NLRB, and the important issue for the labor-management community con-
cerned the direction the Board would take in future Otis II cases. Would
Board members continue to rely on all of the views expressed in Otis II, or
would the NLRB finally settle on a more definitive rule and analysis?
c. The Board's continued reliance upon all the views expressed in Otis II
The Collateral Control Corp. case165 sheds some light on these questions,
for the Board's decision therein retreated from the Otis I labor costs test
in the subcontracting context. A Board panel consisting of Chairman Ste-
phens and Members Babson and Johansen held that the employer violated
section 8(a)(5) by, among other things, failing to bargain with the union
with respect to a subcontracting decision. The most significant aspect of the
decision is the following passage:
The issue presented here is whether, in order to establish the mandatory
bargaining status of an employer's decision to subcontract unit work, the
General Counsel must sustain a burden of showing that the decision turned
on labor costs where "all that is involved is the substitution of one group
of workers for another to perform the same task in the same plant under
the ultimate control of the same employer.'""6
The Board concluded that, under Fibreboard and First National Mainte-
nance, the General Counsel does not bear that burden. In reaching this
conclusion, the Board reasoned that in evaluating the nature of a management
decision, the appellation of the decision in not important. In its view,
bargaining over subcontracting does not turn on the label, but rather on the
substance of the decision itself and its amenability to resolution through
collective bargaining.' 67 In any event, the Board stated, "we find nothing in
any of the opinions expressed in Otis Elevator that would disturb the
principles of the Supreme Court's decision in Fibreboard."' 68
164. Id. slip op. at 30, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 32,888 (Dotson, Chairman, concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (employer substantially restructured its capital and left parts
assembly business).
165. 288 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,363 (Mar. 31, 1988).
166. Id. slip op. at 2, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 32,484 (emphasis added) (quoting
Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 224 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).





Applying Fibreboard and First National Maintenance, the NLRB deter-
mined that: (1) the employer continued to perform the same functions as
the subcontractor it enlisted; (2) the employer's desire to reduce labor costs
was the partial basis and motivation for its decision, and the parties could
have explored alternatives which would have forestalled or prevented the
elimination of jobs; and (3) the prevalence of bargaining over subcontracting
as a matter of industrial practice indicates that the "amenability of subcon-
tracting to negotiation is at least to some extent a function of this type of
management decision itself."' 69 Thus, the Board concluded that the decision
to lay off unit employees and subcontract unit work was a mandatory subject
of bargaining under section 8(d). 170
New Board Member Mary Cracraft did not join with Chairman Stephens
and Member Babson in their reliance on First National Maintenance and all
of the views expressed in Otis H in another case involving an employer's
transfer of work.' 7' The Board ruled that the transfer of certain work from
a bargaining unit to another entity was a mandatory subject of bargaining
because the motivation for the transfer was to cut labor costs. Because the
employer unilaterally transferred the work, the NLRB concluded that the
employer's conduct violated section 8(a)(5). Although Stephens and Babson
stated that the transfer decision was a mandatory subject of bargaining under
First National Maintenance and any of the views expressed in Otis II, 172
Member Cracraft did not join in that statement.
The NLRB recently both endorsed the labor costs standard and continued
to rely on all of the views expressed in Otis IL In WXON-TV, Inc., 73 the
employer, without bargaining with the union, decided to eliminate its pro-
duction department because of insufficient revenues generated by that de-
partment. 74 Relying on Otis II, the Board panel, consisting of Chairman
169. Id. slip op. at 8, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 33,486. In addition, the Board found
that the parties' collective bargaining agreement did not expressly mention a union intention to
waive bargaining on subcontracting, for "subcontracting was not clearly and unmistakably
included in" the labor agreement's management rights clause or other provisions. Id. slip op.
at 9, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 33,486-87. For a discussion of waiver, see Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983).
170. The Board expressly relied on Collateral Control Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 1987-
1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,363 (Mar. 31, 1988) in Ford Bros., Inc., 294 N.L.R.B. No. 10,
5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 15,532 (May 23, 1989). In that case, the Board adopted the A.L.J.'s
conclusion that the employer unlawfully failed to bargain over its decision to subcontract certain
operations. Id. slip op. at 2 n.3, 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) at 29,161 n.3. The Board also found
that, under any view expressed in Otis II, the employer had an obligation to bargain over its
decision to close two terminals and transfer trucking operations to another state. Id.
171. Connecticut Color, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,387
(Apr. 28, 1988).
172. Id. slip op. at 3 n.3, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 33,526 n.3.
173. 289 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,500 (June 30, 1988).
174. The Board found that in 1984 production income fell to $6,900 from $100,000 annually.
Id. slip op. at 2, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 33,792. In 1984, production salaries reached
$184,000. Id. After efforts to increase production revenues proved unsuccessful, the employer
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Stephens and Members Johansen and Babson, declared that "[t]he critical
factor . . . is whether the decision turns upon a change in the nature or
direction of the business, or turns upon labor costs."' 75 Contrary to the
A.L.J., 17 6 however, the Board found that the essence of the employer's
decision to eliminate the department was based on the department's failure
to generate revenues sufficient to justify its existence, i.e., turned on a
fundamental change in the direction of its business. This finding, stated the
Board, was "warranted under any of the views expressed" in Otis II.177
Recognizing that labor costs (salaries) may have played a substantial role,
the Board determined that the department was not economically viable
because of insufficient revenues, irrespective of salaries.17 8 The Board held,
therefore, that the employer did not violate the Act by not bargaining with
the union prior to its decision to eliminate the department.
d. Articulated reasons for the Board's ruling under both the Dotson-
Hunter and Dennis approaches
The NLRB's statements that First National Maintenance and all of the
views expressed in Otis II supported the conclusions it reached in the
foregoing cases were often unaccompanied by either analysis or explication.
In the absence of such analysis, one could only take the Board at its word.
Recently, however, the Board articulated reasons for its ruling under both
the Dotson-Hunter and Dennis approaches in Lapeer Foundry & Machine,
Inc., 7 9 a case in which the Board applied Otis II to an employer's econom-
ically-based layoff decision.
Layoff decisions generally are considered a management right over which
an employer is not required to bargain. Collective bargaining agreements
may contain provisions which set forth the mechanism of layoffs, but most
do not provide for union participation in the decision. In Lapeer Foundry,
a Board panel consisting of Members Stephens, Johansen and Babson con-
sidered what bargaining obligation the employer assumed concerning unilat-
eral layoffs caused solely by economic factors. The Board concluded that
"an employer's decision to lay off employees for economic reasons is a
mandatory subject of bargaining and that the [employer] violated the Act
by failing to bargain over its layoff decision and the effects of that deci-
sion."1s
decided to eliminate the department and terminate the department's three employees. Id. slip
op. at 3, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 33,792.
175. Id. (citing Otis II, 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 892 (1984)).
176. The A.L.J. had concluded that the employer's comparison of salaries to declining
income showed that labor costs were the central reason for eliminating the department. Id. slip
op. at 4, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 33,792.
177. Id. slip op. at 4 n.5, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 33,792 n.s.
178. Id. slip op. at 5, NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 33,792 (although employer had referred to cost
of salaries, "it does not follow that the decision . ..must have 'turned upon' labor costs").
179. 289 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,558 (July 20, 1988).
180. Id. slip op. at 4, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 33,923.
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In so concluding, the Board both applied the Otis H plurality's labor costs
standard and Member Dennis' two-part analysis. With respect to the former,
the Board noted that businesses confronted with economic problems such as
declining sales, excessive inventory, or an unprofitable department may have
several options available to address these problems. These options include
the layoff of employees, the shut-down of a department, the consolidation
of operations, or the transfer of work. Where management decides to
implement layoffs, stated the Board, employees' terms of employment are
directly affected.' 8 ' By contrast, decisions to shut down or consolidate op-
erations involve a direct modification of the enterprise. 8 2 Under the Otis H
plurality's test, the decision to shut down part of a business or consolidate
operations affects the scope, direction, or nature of the business and need
not be bargained over. On the other hand, layoff decisions which turn upon
labor costs, such as in Lapeer Foundry, must be bargained over. 83
According to the Board, the same conclusion was mandated under the
Dennis two-part analysis. Because it is assumed that layoffs will result in
reduced labor costs, "[labor-related considerations therefore form the basis
for the decision."''8 4 The Board stated that unions control this factor, and
can offer alternatives to layoffs such as wage reductions, modified work
rules, and part-time schedules. 85 The Board thus concluded that the layoff
decision was amenable to resolution through the collective bargaining process.
As to the burden placed on management, the Board reasoned that layoff
decisions do not involve investment of capital, alteration of operations, or
a need for confidentiality. While recognizing that management has legitimate
concerns with speed and flexibility in effectuating layoffs in order to remedy
economic problems,8 6 the Board opined that management's burden in bar-
gaining over layoff decisions is outweighed by the benefits of bargaining.
Consequently, "the decision to lay off employees for economic reasons is a
mandatory subject of bargaining."' 87
181. Id. slip op. at 6, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 33,924 ("This decision, like the
decision to reduce worker's wages, necessarily turns on labor costs because the decision itself
is to modify terms of employment in order to save money during economic downturns.").
182. Id. ("Those decisions had only a secondary effect of altering employees' terms of




186. Id. The Board noted that it will require unions to make timely requests to bargain once
notice of a proposed decision to lay off employees is given, and will also require that bargaining
occur in a timely and meaningful fashion. Id. slip op. at 7 n.10, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
at 33,924 n.10.
187. Id. slip op. at 7-8, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 33,924. The Board instructed that
an employer must provid6 notice to the union concerning the decision to lay off employees and
the effects of that decision, and must engage in meaningful bargaining. If a union fails to
request bargaining upon notice of the layoff decision, the Board will find that the employer
has satisfied its bargaining obligation. Id. (citing NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d
1086 (7th Cir. 1987)).
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The Board limited its holding, however, by stressing that Lapeer Foundry
applies only to economically motivated layoff decisions and does not apply
to economically based partial closings, consolidations, transfers of work, or
layoffs occurring pursuant to a labor agreement.'88 As found by the Board,
the layoffs in Lapeer Foundry resulted from a lack of orders and were
effectuated by the employer, without notice to or bargaining with the union,
to address that economic problem. Thus, under Lapeer Foundry, and in the
absence of controlling contractual provisions, decisions to lay off employees
for economic reasons must be bargained over. 89
One problem with the Lapeer Foundry decision is the Board's focus on
the layoff decision and its isolation of that decision from the underlying
facts. The loss of a major customer or an economic downturn, even if
temporary, are conditions outside of management's control which it must
nonetheless address in order to insure the continued and profitable operation
of the enterprise. In that respect, the employer's response to such develop-
ments will involve managerial discretion, and is essentially no different than
its assessment of the same or similar factors which may result in a partial
closure, consolidation, or transfer of work. In either case, the employer is
simply exercising managerial discretion in deciding how best to address
business problems. Under the Board's anal ,sis, however, the same employer
who may legally and unilaterally decide to partially close or consolidate
operations based on economic grounds, which may include labor costs
concerns, is on different footing where it decides to lay off employees because
of those same or similar economic reasons.
The decision in Lapeer Foundry may have a significant impact on unionized
employers. Where labor agreements do not clearly and unequivocally waive
a union's bargaining rights, an employer may be required to bargain over a
layoff decision. As to employers with labor agreements which contain layoff
provisions, the meaning and impact of Lapeer Foundry remains unclear.
Predictably, unions will now seek to bargain over layoff decisions where
contractual layoff provisions refer only to the method of layoff and where
the management rights clause, if any, does not expressly include layoff
decisions as a right reserved to managerial discretion.
C. Summary and Evaluation
The NLRB's record in applying Otis H is characterized by the absence of
either a definitive majority view or an endorsement of any one of the variant
188. Id. slip op. at 9, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 33,925.
189. Id. The layoff decision "was to effect changes in ... employees' terms of employment
in order to reduce labor costs during a period of economic difficulty. The [employer] was thus
obligated to bargain over this decision." Id. See also Stamping Specialty Co., 294 N.L.R.B.
No. 56, 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 15,576 (May 31, 1989) (applying Lapeer Foundry, the Board




views expressed in that decision. Prior to the departure of Chairman Dotson
and Member Hunter, there was still a possibility that a majority would apply
the "business direction-labor costs" standard as the definitive test. In cases
decided after their departure, however, the NLRB has taken an institutional
position which often fails to promote the predictability and certainty so
essential to this area of the law. Because Board members repeatedly state
that a decision is, or is not, a mandatory subject of bargaining under any
of the Otis II analyses, employers cannot rely solely on the arguably more
predictable Dotson-Hunter labor costs standard when deciding whether to
bargain over certain managerial decisions.
In assessing which of the variant Otis II tests would be adopted by a
majority of the Board in future relocation, transfer, and similar cases, it is
this author's view that the labor costs standard is the preferable approach.
The labor costs standard is a predictable and easily understood test which
reflects the First National Maintenance Court's emphasis on the need for
certainty and predictability in this area of the law.190 To be sure, the balancing
and amenability tests articulated by the Dennis and Zimmerman Otis II
concurring opinions can be reconciled with First National Maintenance, and
it is not suggested here that the labor costs standard is the only standard
which is consistent with First National Maintenance. However, in view of
the fact that the Supreme Court has not foreclosed the Board's multifarious
approach in areas other than partial closings,' 9' the nature of the corporate
transactions reviewed by the Board in Otis lI-type cases demand a readily
understandable and more easily applied test such as the labor costs standard.
Apart from the question of which Otis II analysis should be applied is
the broader issue of the Board's refusal to adopt a majority view or to
articulate an approach which offers a detailed analysis of its application of
all the Otis II views in specific cases. That "refusal to choose among the
various views expressed in Otis II must be viewed as disappointing, if not
unconscionable, from the perspective of employers, unions, and affected
employees.' ' 92 Thus, regardless of one's views with regard to the proper test
to apply in managerial decision cases, the labor-management community
must be able to conduct their affairs in light of a clearly articulated and
established legal test. The Board must both recognize and resolve this issue
in the near future.
Absent the Board's adoption of a definitive majority rule, all legal advice
given in this area must take into account and rely upon all of the views in
Otis II, including Member Dennis' concurrence which employed a "benefits-
burden balancing" analysis. Such conservative and protective advice is war-
ranted by the General Counsel's determination that NLRB Regions must
review cases under both the labor costs and amenability to bargaining
190. See Miscimarra, supra note 1, at 81.
191. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
192. Miscimarra, supra note 1, at 81.
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standards set forth in the plurality and concurring opinions. Thus, an unfair
labor practice charge which alleges an employer's failure to bargain over a
management decision could result in: (1) an investigation which reviewed the
reasons underlying the employer's decision; and (2) a determination as to
whether the benefits of bargaining outweighed the burdens that bargaining
would impose on the employer. 19 3
In the subcontracting context, the NLRB has now concluded, definitively
and unequivocally, that the General Counsel does not bear the burden of
proving that an employer's decision was motivated by labor costs. 194 While
one may quarrel with either the latter conclusion or with the labor costs
standard itself, the Board's declaration on the fundamental point of labor
costs in the subcontracting context at least provides some clarity and guidance
to both management and labor.
The Otis H plurality's labor costs standard has nonetheless been criticized
by commentators as being inconsistent with the First National Maintenance
balancing test.' 95 That criticism, and the well-founded but variant analytical
tests proposed by the Board members, may have resulted in an institutional
reluctance by the NLRB to adopt a single, determinative standard. Moreover,
by relying on all of the views expressed in Otis I, the Board may have acted
with an eye toward judicial review of its predecision bargaining decisions,
particularly during the absence of appellate court review of the Otis H line
of cases. That review has now begun.
IV. APPELLATE REVIEW OF Otis H
A. The Fifth Circuit: Local 2179
The Board successfully defended the Otis II labor costs standard in Local
2179, United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 196 the first appellate review of that case.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a Board
decision that an employer's plant relocation decision was not subject to
mandatory bargaining under section 8(d). 97 The court stated that the central
issue was whether the Otis II labor costs standard was sustainable under
193. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the NLRB General
Counsel on Otis Elevator Guidelines, reprinted in 1984 Labor Relations Yearbook (BNA) 363-
66 (1985) (NLRB General Counsel Guideline Memorandum GC 84-12, June 14, 1984).
194. Collateral Control Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,363
(Mar. 31, 1988).
195. See, e.g., George, supra note 6, at 699; Gorman, supra note 6, at 1365-66.
196. 822 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1987).
197. Inland Steel Container Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 929 (1985), review denied, 822 F.2d 559 (5th
Cir. 1987). In Inland Steel, the A.L.J., affirmed by the Board, concluded that the employer's
decision to relocate production from Louisiana to a plant in Mississippi was not primarily
motivated by, and did not turn on, labor costs considerations. Both the A.L.J. and the Board
relied on the Otis II plurality's "turns upon labor costs" standard. Id. at 929 n.1, 937.
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First National Maintenance, 198 which held that an employer's partial closing
decision based on economic motives was not a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining.
The union contended that First National Maintenance required the NLRB
to apply the Supreme Court's balancing test to each type of employer decision
involving either entrepreneurial control or an impact on job security or
employment itself. 99 According to the union, such an application of the
First National Maintenance balancing test would yield one rule applicable
to all plant relocation decisions regardless of the facts or circumstances. 2°°
In the alternative, the union argued that First National Maintenance required
the Board to apply the Supreme Court's balancing test on a case-by-case
basis to the particular facts of each case arising from an employer's decision
in this area.2 0' The NLRB, however, prevailed against the union's challenge,
with the Fifth Circuit rejecting the latter's arguments and holding that the
NLRB acted within its discretion in applying the "turns upon labor costs"
standard to plant relocation decisions. 20 2
With respect to the union's first argument, the court conceded that the
language of First National Maintenance did offer some basis for the union's
claim that the NLRB was required to adopt a per se rule in plant relocation
cases.20 3 In particular, the court noted, a per se rule would be more predictable
than the labor costs standard. 204 Nevertheless, because First National Main-
tenance recognized management's need for free and speedy operation, "it
would seem anomalous to wholly sacrifice those goals to the evidently
subsidiary goal of enhanced predictability, especially where in many instances
the decision would not be amenable to resolution through the bargaining
process. ' 20S Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that First National
Maintenance applied only to partial closings done "purely for economic
reasons," that is, situations where labor costs were an important factor but
not a crucial circumstance. 20 6 The court also reasoned that it was unclear
whether First National Maintenance required mandatory bargaining in cases
where labor costs were the entire motivation for a partial plant closing. In
support of its reasoning, the court noted that the Supreme Court had limited
198. Local 2179, United Steelworkers, 822 F.2d at 561.
199. "Category 3" decisions are discussed supra at notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
200. Local 2179, United Steelworkers, 822 F.2d at 576.
201. Id.
202. Id. The court noted that it was not deciding whether the NLRB may properly apply
the same analysis to other types of Category 3 decisions. Id. at 576 n.25.
203. Id. at 576.
204. Id. The court stated, "[dloubtless greater predictability would be enhanced by holding
that all plant relocation decisions are subject to mandatory bargaining, as opposed to only
those which turn on labor costs." Id. However, the court noted that the employer would
generally be aware of whether its decision turned on labor costs, and further observed that the
union would often be sufficiently informed to protect its rights. Id.
205. Id. (emphasis in original).
206. Id. (quoting First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 686).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
its holding to the specific facts before it,2°7 and had indicated "no view as
to other types of management decisions." ' 08 Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that First National Maintenance did not call for a per se, across the board
rule with regard to topics of mandatory bargaining.
The court likewise rejected the union's second argument that First National
Maintenance required a "benefits and burdens of bargaining" test to be
applied on an ad hoc basis. The court stated that, "[g]iven the inherent
unquantifiability of many of the factors considered important in First Na-
tional Maintenance . . . an ad hoc approach would likely be far more
destructive of predictability than the Board's 'turns upon labor costs' stan-
dard."20 9 Furthermore, the court concluded that the First National Mainte-
nance Court would have expressly stated that it was requiring ad hoc
balancing in all cases, had it actually done so. Therefore, the court would
not arrive at such a rule by implication.
The Fifth Circuit thus determined that the ruling in First National Main-
tenance did not extend beyond economically motivated partial closings, or
at least not beyond those which did not turn on labor costs. Furthermore,
the court expressly read First National Maintenance as disclaiming any
particular substantive result. The court did recognize that First National
Maintenance suggested that the Board should give significant consideration
to management prerogatives, and that the extent to which bargaining over
business conduct decisions have an impact on employment is both meaningful
and practical. However, the Fifth Circuit did not read the Supreme Court's
decision as dictating any particular methodology which the Board should
follow.
For example, the Fifth Circuit considered the concurring opinions in Otis
11,210 and determined that the Board was not required to adopt any one of
the formulas proposed therein. As the court stated:
We believe the Board could legitimately conclude that the "turns upon
labor costs" standard was preferable because of its greater simplicity and
predictability. In essence that standard performs the balancing by deter-
mining that where, and only where, the decision turns on labor costs it is
sufficiently likely to be amenable to resolution through collective bargain-
ing as to outweigh the burden of management constraints.2"
Accordingly, in the absence of clearer direction from the Supreme Court,
the Fifth Circuit declined to impose a specific methodology on the Board. 212
207. Id. at 577 (citing First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 687).
208. Id. (quoting First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 686 n.22).
209. Id.
210. See supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of the concurring opinions
of Members Dennis and Zimmerman in Otis II.
211. Local 2179, United Steelworkers, 822 F.2d at 579.
212. Id. at 580. The court additionally noted language in First National Maintenance which
indicated that mandatory bargaining is not required "even where 'labor costs are an important
factor in . . . the [employer's] decision to close[]."' Id. at 579 (quoting First Natl Maintenance,
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The court did hold, however, that the Otis H labor costs standard was a
reasonably defensible interpretation of First National Maintenance. The court
viewed the labor costs standard as a principled attempt to respond to First
National Maintenance and Fibreboard; one that avoided both a rigid per se
approach as well as an unpredictable and administratively difficult ad hoc
approach. The court stated that the Board's application of the labor costs
standard to a plant relocation decision was neither inconsistent with, nor an
unprincipled construction of, the Act. Thus, under a deferential review of
the Board's ruling, 2 1 the court was willing to endorse the labor costs standard
in preference to the various other standards which the Board had rejected. 2t4
The Fifth Circuit's reading of First National Maintenance indicates that
it refused to foreclose the Board's use of the labor costs standard. First
National Maintenance only involved a partial closing, and intimated no view
as to other types of management decisions. The Fifth Circuit therefore
declined to hold that the Supreme Court's decision required ad hoc balancing
or any other methodology in the case before it. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit
found that the Board could properly conclude that the labor costs standard
was a simpler and more predictable test. Consequently, the court upheld
both the Board's selection and application of that test.
B. The First Circuit: Westinghouse Broadcasting
After its successful defense of the labor costs standard in the Fifth Circuit,
the Board succeeded in enforcing its order requiring an employer to undo
unilateral subcontracting in NLRB v. Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable,
Inc.2"5 There, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
452 U.S. at 682). Other language, moreover, suggested that all economically-based partial
closings "are exempt from mandatory bargaining." Id. (citing First National Maintenance, 452
U.S. at 685). Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit did not read First National Maintenance as requiring
a test broader than the labor costs standard.
213. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (discussing Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB,
441 U.S. 488 (1979)).
214. Local 2179, United Steelworkers, 822 F.2d at 580. The Fifth Circuit was "more inclined
to deference in our review of the Board's efforts to select a workable and principled approach
from among a universe of at least partially flawed alternatives." Id. The court's view of the
Otis H plurality decision as the "dominant, binding opinion of the Board" has since been
rejected by the District of Columbia Circuit in UFCW Int'l Union, Local 150-A v. NLRB, No.
88-1084, slip op. at 22 n.5 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 4, 1989).
The Fifth Circuit noted that the case involved two interrelated decisions, "each clearly lying
at the core of entrepreneurial control."Local 2179, United Steelworkers, 822 F.2d at 578. The
employer's decision to permanently close one of its facilities was similar to a partial closing,
and the decision to acquire a new facility at a different location to perform some or all of the
closed facility's functions "[did] not enhance the adverse effects on the employees at the closed
facility. Nor [did] it significantly dilute the character of the overall transaction as one lying at
the core of entrepreneurial control." Id.
215. 849 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1988). See also NLRB v. Plymouth Stamping Div., Eltec Corp.,
870 F.2d 1112 (6th Cir. 1989). In Plymouth Stamping Div., Eltec. Corp., 286 N.L.R.B. No.
85, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,088 (Nov. 19, 1987), the court affirmed the Board's
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concluded that the employer's decision to eliminate a bargaining unit and
to subcontract unit work fell squarely within the holding of Fibreboard.21 6
Neither party contested the Board's application of the Otis H labor costs
rule. Rather, the employer asserted that the subcontracting decision did not
turn upon labor costs because it resulted from a change in the direction of
the business caused by the elimination of the unit. Unpersuaded by the
employer's assertion, the court reasoned that there was no logical reason for
the employer's decision other than labor costs. Noting the employer's efforts
to maintain "the lowest personnel costs necessary to produce the desired
product," the court determined that it was immaterial that the work force
reduction resulted from the sale of a division of the company. 21 7
The First Circuit also applied the First National Maintenance balancing
test, and concluded that the employer's decision was also amenable to
resolution through the bargaining process. Among other things, the court
noted that collective bargaining could have affected the employer's decision
in that union proposals could have addressed the employer's financial and
service needs. 218
C. The Fourth Circuit: Arrow Automotive
In spite of the favorable rulings in the Fifth and First Circuits, the Board
encountered rough sledding in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. In Arrow Automotive Industries, Inc. v. NLRB,219 the court
held that an employer did not have to bargain over a decision to close one
of its facilities in Massachusetts and transfer the work to South Carolina.
In so holding, the court overturned the NLRB's decision and determined
order which held that the employer's decision to subcontract assembly work was a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Relegating the Otis H plurality opinion to a parenthetical, the Sixth
Circuit instead relied on Fibreboard, First National Maintenance, and NLRB v. Production
Molded Plastics, Inc., 604 F.2d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1979) (subject is mandatory if "collective
bargaining in advance of the decision might have produced a union offer which could have
affected the decision to transfer the jobs."). Plymouth Stamping, 870 F.2d at 1116-17.
216. Westinghouse Broadcasting, 849 F.2d at 22. The employer sold a separate division which
employed eleven individuals. After the sale, the employer's parent directed the employer to
reduce its staff by eleven positions. The employer then decided to terminate a unit of news
department carriers. Id. at 17.
217. Id. at 23.
218. Id. (The A.L.J. found that "the Union ... could have shown the Company that it
could save more money and receive superior service by retaining the [employees] and possibly
expanding the scope of their duties."). Id.
219. 853 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1988). In Arrow Automotive Industries, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No.
57, 1986-1987 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 18,949 (June 25, 1987), the Board concluded that the
employer was obligated to bargain over its 1981 decision to close a Massachusetts facility, and
transfer the work to South Carolina because of escalating production costs and a declining
market. In the Board's view, the employer's decision turned on labor costs and was a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Id. slip op. at 8, 1986-1987 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 32,505. Members
Johansen and Babson additionally relied on First National Maintenance and any of the views
set forth in Otis I. Id. slip op. at 8 n.4, 1986-1987 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 32,505 n.4.
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that the Otis II labor costs standard was "flatly inconsistent with First
National Maintenance. "220
After reviewing in detail the Supreme Court's analysis in First National
Maintenance, the Fourth Circuit criticized Otis II in several respects. Noting
the Dotson-Hunter labor costs analysis, the court stated:
[Tihe Board's labor-costs standard provides scant guidance or predictability
to companies faced with fundamental business decisions. It also establishes
an exception to the First National Maintenance decision that threatens to
swallow its rule. As one commentator has noted, the Board's standard is
problematic in itself because "management decisions may turn on labor
costs and involve a fundamental change in the business." 22'
The parties in Arrow Automotive had stipulated that part of the reason
the employer closed the Massachusetts facility was the declining market
served by that plant. In the Fourth Circuit's view, however, the labor costs
standard might "require bargaining where a management decision is based
on other considerations in addition to labor costs." 2 2 Moreover, the court
found the labor costs standard's definition of entrepreneurial control to be
unclear because the court would not have predicted that closing a manufac-
turing plant was excluded from such control. 23
Furthermore, the court found no distinction between "labor costs" and
"economic reasons" for a plant closing. As the court stated,
"Economic reasons" are not reasons distinct and apart from a desire to
decrease labor costs. The Supreme Court uses the term "economic reasons"
in contrasting business decisions from decisions based on anti-union ani-
mus .... Labor costs are inescapably a part of the economic picture of
the enterprise, and management's consideration of them in basic business
decisions does not render First National Maintenance inapplicable.124
According to the court, the Board's labor costs standard was "flatly
inconsistent" with First National Maintenance, the Supreme Court having
"made clear that bargaining over the decision is not required. ' 225 With
regard to labor costs, the Fourth Circuit quoted the Supreme Court as stating
that "labor costs are an important factor in a failing operation and the
decision to close, [and] management will have an incentive to confer vol-
untarily with the union to seek concessions that may make continuing the
business profitable. ' 2 6 Comparing the maintenance company's decision in
First National Maintenance to terminate a contract with Arrow Automotive's
220. Arrow Automotive, 853 F.2d at 228.
221. Id. at 227 (quoting George, supra note 6, at 689 n.IlI (emphasis in quotation)).
222. Id. at 228 (emphasis in original).
223. Id. ("In this case, the Board concluded that the closing of an entire manufacturing
facility was not such a change [in the direction or nature of the enterprise]. Yet this result
would not have been easy to predict on the basis of earlier Board decisions.").
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. (quoting First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 682) (emphasis added).
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shutdown of an entire manufacturing facility, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that, under the Supreme Court's ruling, Arrow's decision had significantly
changed its operations.
In the Fourth Circuit's view, the parties' stipulation that economic factors
(decreasing sales and increased production costs) prompted the closing, even
though the employer was frustrated with the course of labor relations, did
not place the closing decision outside of First National Maintenance.227 The
employer's attitude toward labor relations might have led to an evaluation
of the facility, but if the closing itself was not motivated by anti-union
animus, the Fourth Circuit would not require bargaining. 2 1
The Fourth Circuit then applied First National Maintenance to the specific
facts of Arrow Automotive. The court found no reason to believe that
bargaining would have had any effect inasmuch as the company's decision
stemmed from a forty-percent decline of the market the company served. In
addition, current labor practice suggested to the court that the decision was
not suited to resolution through bargaining, because contract provisions
covering relocations or closings were not common. The Fourth Circuit also
noted that full effects bargaining had taken place, the employer had not
refused to bargain with the union, and the employer had no history of
committing other unfair labor practices. 2 9
Turning to the burden which bargaining would place on the employer, the
court reasoned that the magnitude of the decision to close the entire facility
and reallocate capital underscored management's need for certainty. In the
court's view, the labor costs standard would leave management "at sea as
to whether it had an obligation to bargain," because management's decision
to close and transfer would remain vulnerable to an adverse Board ruling. 230
Speed, flexibility and competitiveness may also be sacrificed, the court
determined, where management is required to bargain to impasse over a
227. Id. at 229. The Board contended that the employer's bargaining decision was prompted
by its frustration with the bargaining process.
228. Id. at 229. ("Frustration with the course of labor relations may well play a part in
prompting a company to consider closing a facility, but absent the unfair labor practices covered
by Darlington," bargaining is not required). For a discussion of Darlington, 380 U.S. 263
(1965), see supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
In classifying the employer's closing and transfer of work, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
the employer's action was not a "relocation." A relocation, wrote the court, involves a situation
"where an employer replaces an existing plant with a new plant that will perform the same
work in a different place." Arrow Automotive, 853 F.2d at 229. A partial closing, added the
court, involved the "closing of one or more facilities by the employer having more facilities
than those which" are closed. Id. In any event, wrote the court, "cases are not to be resolved
by placing decisions within rigid categories such as 'partial closing,' 'relocation,' or 'consoli-
dation."' Id. Determination of whether bargaining is required does not depend on finding the
proper label, stated the court. Id. at 229-30.
229. Id. at 230-31.
230. Id. at 232 (uncertainty results because "an employer could never be certain when a
decision might eventually be found by the Board to be too closely related to labor costs.").
[Vol. 39:43
1989] PREDECISION BARGAINING 87
closing decision. 3 Finally, the court found a real possibility that a mandatory
bargaining obligation would give a union a powerful tool for delay and
would require the continued operation of an unprofitable plant.
Obviously the court showed no deference to the Board in rejecting its
analysis and ruling. The Fourth Circuit stated that the Supreme Court
remains the final arbiter of the meaning of the Act, and the Court's decisions
are binding upon both the Board and the lower courts. Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the employer's decision in Arrow Automotive
fit squarely within First National Maintenance. The harm done to the
employer's need to operate freely in making its shutdown decision for
economic reasons outweighed the incremental benefit that might have been
gained in bargaining 22
.Thus, unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit saw no need to defer
to a Board ruling which it concluded was flatly inconsistent with First
.National Maintenance. The court determined the labor costs standard of
Otis H to be unpredictable and an exception which could swallow the
balancing test set forth in the Supreme Court's decision. Additionally, the
Fourth Circuit found that a Board rule which requires an employer to
speculate as to whether labor costs are sufficiently and closely related to the
employer's decision will result in uncertainty, rather than the predictability
called for by First National Maintenance. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit
found no distinction between economic reasons and labor costs, reasoning
that labor costs are an essential and inescapable part of the economic picture
of any business.
D. The Seventh Circuit: W.W. Grainger
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit recently deferred to
the Board's labor costs standard in W. W. Grainger, Inc. v. NLRB.233 In
that case, the Board had ruled, inter alia, that an employer violated section
8(a)(5) of the Act by cancelling a contract with a company which provided
the employer with drivers. The drivers had requested compensation for
"branch time," or non-driving time spent at distribution points or retail
destinations. The employer rejected the request and subsequently contracted
with another entity.
231. Id. (In shutdown cases, "management may need to act swiftly in winding down the
operation and reallocating or selling property and equipment.").
232. Id. Chief Judge Winter dissented, arguing that the NLRB's decision was supported by
substantial record evidence and that the court should defer to that ruling. In his view, the
employer's decision fell within the category of management decisions to which First National
Maintenance balancing should be applied: the employer's action was a relocation and not a
partial closing; the employer was motivated by the employees' rejection of its contract offer;
and the union had control over escalating production costs (including health insurance costs).
Id. at 238-39 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
233. 860 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1988).
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Agreeing that the employer's cancellation of the contract was a mandatory
subject of bargaining, the court relied on the Otis I plurality's distinction
between decisions which turn on labor costs and those which involve basic
changes in the employer's enterprise. 234 Giving due deference to the Board's
expertise with respect to mandatory bargaining subject determinations, 235 the
court concluded that the final event which caused the employer to terminate
its contract was the controversy surrounding the costs of branch time, an
issue which turned upon labor costs. 2 6 Thus, the court concluded the contract
issue was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
E. The D.C. Circuit: UFCW Int'l Union, Local 150-A
In August 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit issued a significant decision which discussed at length the
Board's practice of determining whether an employer's decision is, or is not,
a mandatory subject of bargaining under the three Otis I opinions and the
different analyses set forth in those opinions. In UFCW International Union,
Local 150-A v. NLRB, 237 the court rejected the Board's 1987 summary
affirmance of an A.L.J.'s decision that the employer's relocation of certain
operations from Dubuque, Iowa to Rochelle, Illinois did not turn upon labor
costs, but rather turned upon a fundamental change in the scope, nature
and direction of the employer's business. 2 8 In so doing, two members of
the Board's three-member panel stated that the employer was not obligated
to bargain under any of the views expressed in Otis JI. 239
234. Id. at 248 (In Otis II, "the Board held that where a decision turns upon labor costs,
the employer was obligated to bargain. Only where the decision turns upon a change in the
nature or direction of the business, was management free to act independently.").
235. Id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 495 (1979)).
236. Id. (issue of branch time "certainly appears to involve a direct labor cost"). Although
the cancellation of the agreement was held to be a mandatory bargaining subject, the court
determined that the union had waived its right to bargain over the subject. Finding that the
union had notice and an opportunity to negotiate over the matter, the court found no violation
of § 8(a)(5) of the Act. Id. at 248-50.
237. No. 88-1084 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 4, 1989).
238. This case involved the employer's 1981 relocation of its hog kill and hog cut operations
from Dubuque, Iowa to Rochelle, Illinois. The union alleged that the employer breached its
bargaining duty by failing to engage in predecision bargaining before the relocation. Hearings
were held before an A.L.J. of the Board in 1983, and the parties filed final briefs with the
A.L.J. before the Board decided Otis .
The A.L.J.'s decision, released in 1985, relied on Otis II in concluding that the relocation
did not turn upon costs. Id. slip op. at 12. In his decision, the A.L.J. noted, inter alia, that
the employer had been unsuccessful in raising from banks or the federal government five million
dollars needed to modernize the Dubuque, Iowa facility; that the employer had lost its credit
line and future financing was uncertain; and that the Rochelle, Illinois facility to which
operations were relocated was a smaller, newer, and more modern facility. Id. slip op. at 12.
239. Dubuque Packing Company, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
19,213 (Dec. 16, 1987).
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The District of Columbia Circuit initially reviewed the Supreme Court's
decisions in Fibreboard and First National Maintenance,240 as well as the
three separate opinions and tests set out by the Board in Otis I.241 Noting
that Fibreboard and First National Maintenance did not compel the ap-
proaches taken by the Board in Otis I,242 the court concluded that, with
respect to questions of relocation, "each of the Otis H approaches gives at
least a plausible reading to the requirements of First National Mainte-
nance. ' 243 In the court's view, however, the First National Maintenance
Court's sensitivity to management prerogatives made it difficult to maintain
that bargaining over relocation decisions would be required anytime labor
costs are a factor. As the court reasoned:
Ascertaining whether or not a decision to relocate "turns upon labor
costs," or whether it is "amenable" to collective bargaining, provides
acceptable, albeit restricted, proxies for identifying management decisions
that do not require special "speed, flexibility, and secrecy," and which
would be fruitful subjects of negotiations between management and labor.
What the Otis H standard lacks by way of underemphasis of mandatory
bargaining, it arguably compensates for with greater simplicity and pre-
dictability-perhaps subsidiary, but not altogether unimportant goals under
the Act. These are the sorts of factors that courts have long charged the
Board with balancing. 2"
Notwithstanding its views of the broad acceptability of Otis I, the court
ultimately concluded that the Board's decision in UFCW Int'l Union "falls
short of the standards of reasoned decisionmaking that we customarily
require in judicial review. 2 45 Citing to Otis H and prior Board decisions,
the court opined that in the past the Board had ascertained the basis upon
which relevant decisionmakers arrived at their decision. "[Tihe relevant
factors must have been contemporaneous with or have predated the decision
itself, and the exercise must involve an effort to determine what was actually
in the minds of those making the decision. '246 In that regard, the court
noted that the A.L.J.'s opinion, which the Board adopted, simply justified
the employer's decision without stating that any person with responsibility
for making the relocation decision actually believed that it turned on any
factor other than labor costs.
Thus, stated the court, if the Board adheres to the "turns upon labor
costs" standard in relocation decisions, the Board must: (1) identify the
factors considered "in determining the employer's contemporaneous motive
for its decision"; and, (2) "apply those factors . . . to determine whether
the contemporaneous evidence . . . support[ed] the conclusion that . . . the
240. UFCW Int'l Union, slip op. at 15-18.
241. Id. slip op. at 18-21.
242. Id. slip op. at 21.
243. Id. slip op. at 23.
244. Id. slip op. at 24-25.
245. Id. slip op. at 25.
246. Id. slip op. at 26.
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decision 'turned upon' entrepreneurial factors, rather than labor costs. '247
If, however, the Board chooses to apply a justification analysis of the
employer's actions, the court instructed the Board to: (1) explain why it has
taken that approach; and, (2) identify the factors controlling its determina-
tion.14
s
Turning to the Board's affirmance of the A.L.J.'s decision, the court
addressed the Board's consistent declination to choose among the three Otis
H opinions when deciding predecision bargaining cases. Acknowledging that
the Otis H opinions "share certain common understandings," the court
noted that the Otis H plurality and concurring opinions differ in certain
significant respects.2 49 The D.C. Circuit remanded the case back to the Board
because, in the court's view, the Board had to take a definitive stance:
[Tihe Board must accept responsibility for clarifying and identifying the
standards that are guiding its decisions. We urge the Board to look seriously
at the present case on remand and to attempt to articulate a majority-
supported statement of the rule that the Board will be applying now and
in the future in determining whether a particular decision is subject to
mandatory bargaining or not.
If the Board declined to articulate a majority rule, the court instructed
the Board to then explain its conclusion that the Otis H opinions would all
yield the same result. Finding nothing in the record showing that there was
a need for secrecy, speed, or flexibility in Dubuque Packing Company's
relocation decision, the court also found no indication that any such need
would exist that could not have been accommodated within the context of
mandatory bargaining. 2s 1
247. Id. slip op. at 28 (emphasis added).
248. Id. slip op. at 29.
249. Id. slip op. at 31. The court noted, inter alia, that Member Zimmerman's opinion would
apparently require bargaining even where labor costs were not the direct cause of a relocation
decision, "but when labor concessions might nevertheless offset the concerns that are motivating
the decision." Id. (emphasis in original).
250. Id.
251. Id. slip op. at 32. The court also criticized the Board for its failure to reconcile its
result in Dubuque Packing Company with the results reached in prior Board decisions, partic-
ularly Plymouth Stamping Div., Eltec. Corp., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) 19,088 (Nov. 19, 1987), enforced, 870 F.2d 1112 (6th Cir. 1989). UFCW Int'l Union,
slip op. at 32-33.
In addition, the court concluded that the Board improperly ignored the union's argument
that, even if no duty to bargain arose with respect to the relocation decision, the bargaining
obligation did arise when the employer sought to renegotiate certain modifications to mandatory
subjects during the term of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. If the Board concluded
on remand that the employer had no duty to bargain over the relocation decision, the court
stated that it expected the Board to address the question of whether the good faith bargaining
obligation arises when an employer brings both permissive and mandatory subjects to the table
and seeks concessions on the mandatory subjects in exchange for company agreements on the
permissive subjects. UCFW int'l Union, slip op. at 34-35. "We find no clear answer to this
question in the Board's precedent, and thus we leave it to the Board, in its expertise, to confront
the claim initially." Id. at 35.
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The District of Columbia Circuit's remand of the Dubuque Packing Co.
case serves as a significant opportunity for the Board to clarify its Otis II
analysis and definitively resolve the uncertainty and ambiguity flowing from
its subsequent reliance on all of the different standards set forth therein.
While a majority statement of the rule applicable to these cases would be
preferred, it must be noted that the Board has recently attempted to explain
the analysis supporting its conclusion that all of the Otis II tests lead to the
same result. For example, in Lapeer Foundry,25 2 the Board applied both the
labor costs standard and Member Dennis' two-part analysis in concluding
that an employer violated the Act by failing to bargain over a layoff
decision.2"3 Similarly, in The Reece Corporation,25 4 a panel majority of the
Board ruled that an employer's decision to transfer work was a mandatory
subject of bargaining since the decision essentially turned upon labor costs. 255
The majority in Reece also applied the Dennis test, concluding that labor
costs were a significant consideration in the employer's decision which could
have been addressed and negated by union concessions. 2 6 Furthermore, the
majority opined that under the Zimmerman test, the decision would clearly
be a mandatory subject of bargaining because it was motivated by labor
cost concerns which union concessions could have substantially mitigated. 2 7
Given these isolated attempts to apply all of the Otis II tests, it is not a
foregone conclusion that the Board will adopt one majority test and abandon
the others.
In addition, the Board's choice between the contemporaneous motive and
justification analyses as the proper standard of review of an employer's
managerial decision will certainly impact upon the investigation and litigation
of Otis I-type cases. Under a contemporaneous motive analysis, the focus
of the Board's and the courts' inquiry would be upon the factors and
evidence actually considered by the decisionmaker prior to and at the time
of the decision. Under a justification analysis, the focus would be upon
those factors which establish that the decision was or could be justified as
evidenced by a subsequent review of factors which, although not actually
considered at the time of the decision, demonstrate that the decision was
252. See supra notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
254. 294 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 5 Lab. L. Rep. 15,546 (May 3, 1989).
255. Id. slip op. at 6, 5 Lab. L. Rep. at 29,201. In so ruling, Chairman Stephens and
Member Cracraft noted that the employer had previously advised the union that, inter alia, the
labor agreement imposed excessive costs, and that changes in wages, benefits, and working time
spent on union matters were needed. In their view, it was "unreasonable for the [employer]
now to argue that the decision turned essentially on factors other than labor costs." Id. slip
op. at 8, 5 Lab. L. Rep. at 29,202.
256. Id. slip op. at 8 n.6, 5 Lab. L. Rep. at 29,202 n.6.
257. Id. Dissenting, Member Johansen found it unnecessary to apply Otis H to the employer's
transfer decision because, in his view, the union had waived the right to bargain over the
decision. Id. slip op. at 21, 5 Lab. L. Rep. at 29,205 (Johansen, Member, dissenting).
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not a mandatory subject of bargaining. This issue bears watching as the
Board reconsiders its decision in UFCW Int'l Union.
F. Summary and Evaluation
Will the Board continue its current approach of relying on the variant
views of Otis II and the differing interpretations of First National Mainte-
nance set forth in the NLRB's 1984 decision, or will the Board's decision
and analysis in the case remanded by the District of Columbia Circuit result
in a majority rule governing future relocation cases? Will other federal courts
of appeals join with the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in endorsing the labor
costs standard as a reasonably defensible interpretation of First National
Maintenance? Or will other courts reach a different result and find, as did
the Fourth Circuit, that the "turns upon labor costs" standard is inconsistent
with the "benefits/burden balancing" analysis of First National Mainte-
nance? These questions will likely be the subject of future litigation and
disposition by the NLRB, the lower courts and, perhaps ultimately, the
Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
Employers, labor organizations, and employees are directly affected by
the legal standards applied in entrepreneurial decision and control cases.
Because NLRB resolution of the question of whether decision bargaining is
required in plant closings, relocations, and subcontracting is of obvious
importance, a clear, coherent and predictable standard is warranted. The
NLRB shoulders the responsibility of clearly delineating the boundaries of
managerial discretion in this area pursuant to an analysis which, at the very
least, applies and explains an identifiable test and methodology. 258
If a decision falls within the mandatory bargaining obligation of the
NLRA, all segments of the labor-management community are entitled to
assert their rights with some certainty of legal support. 2 9 If predecision
bargaining is not required, employers should be able to avail themselves of
the benefits of lawful unilateral action which is unencumbered by lengthy
and costly litigation before the NLRB and the courts.2 60 The public policy
of management discretion in this area is not promoted where the legality of
the employer's action is uncertain and is only decided years after an entre-
preneurial decision is made.
To promote certainty and direction, the Board should clarify which of the
Otis II tests must be satisfied in predecision bargaining cases. As a practical
matter, compliance with the Otis II plurality's labor costs test and/or the
Dennis and Zimmerman formulations, as well as the General Counsel's Otis





H Memorandum, requires that an employer be prepared to defend its actions
under the benefits-burden balancing test as well as the labor costs standard.
Sole reliance on the latter standard could be risky.
Given the circuit court's differing views regarding the labor costs standard,
it may be posited that the Board has a duty to take a definitive stance and
to further explore and explain its methodology in deciding predecision bar-
gaining cases. 26' In any event, the NLRB's and courts' treatment of this
issue ensures that questions with regard to the Board's application of Otis
II will continue to be points of uncertainty and contention in the foreseeable
future.
261. See UFCW Int'l Union, slip op. at 36-37 (court insisted on "well-articulated reasoning
in Board opinions" to insure that Board decisionmaking was not arbitrary and capricious); cf.
Nielsen Lithographing Co. v. NLRB, 854 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1988). Regarding the employer's
duty to disclose information under NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956), the Seventh
Circuit stated, "[flaced with a conflict both in the circuits and its own decisions, the Board
had the duty to take a stance, to explain which decisions it agreed with and why, and to explore
the possibility of intermediate solutions." Nielsen Lithographing, 854 F.2d at 1067.
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